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A General Equilibrium 
Asset-  Pricing Approach to 
the Measurement of Nominal 
and Real Bank Output
J. Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
In many service industries, measuring real output is a challenge, because it 
is diﬃcult to measure quality- adjusted prices. In ﬁ  nancial services, however, 
there is not even an agreed upon conceptual basis for measuring nominal, 
let alone real, output.1 This chapter presents a dynamic, stochastic, general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model in which nominal and real values of bank out-
put—and hence the price deﬂ  ator—are clearly deﬁ  ned. We use the model 
to assess the inadequacy of existing national accounting measures, and we 
derive a theoretically preferred alternative. Our model is a general equilib-
rium (GE) extension of Wang’s (2003a) partial equilibrium framework, and 
it validates Wang’s proposed bank service ﬂ  ow measure.
The biggest challenge for measurement is that banks and other ﬁ  nancial 
service providers often do not charge explicit fees for services. Instead, they 
charge indirectly by the spread between the interest rates they charge and 
pay. The System of National Accounts, 1993 (United Nations et al. 1993; 
hereafter SNA93) thus recommends measuring these “ﬁ  nancial interme-
diation services indirectly measured” (FISIM) using net interest, deﬁ  ned 
as “the total property income receivable by ﬁ  nancial intermediaries minus 
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their total interest payable, excluding the value of any property income 
receivable from the investment of their own funds.”2 The so-  called user 
cost approach to banking is taken to be the theoretical basis for measuring 
nominal output via interest rate margins and for interpreting interest rate 
spreads as implicit prices for ﬁ  nancial services.3 As a practical matter, the 
SNA93 approach more or less equates nominal output from FISIM with 
the net interest income that ﬂ  ows through banks.
Net interest income from lending is the conceptual diﬀerence between 
interest income received and the opportunity cost of funds lent. As currently 
implemented (e.g., in SNA93), net interest is imputed using the diﬀerence 
between actual lending rates and a riskless interest rate, such as a short- term 
Treasury rate, which is meant to capture the opportunity cost of funds. 
However, Wang (2003a) shows that net interest contains not only nominal 
compensation for bank services but also the return due to the systematic 
risk of bank loans. This return is part of the opportunity cost of funds, and 
according to the essence of the user cost framework, it should be excluded 
from bank output. In modern ﬁ  nance theories of asset pricing, the required 
rate of return depends on risk. Hence, the user cost of money needs to be 
adjusted for risk. Wang’s (2003a) key contribution is the extension of the 
user cost approach to a world with risk. This contrasts with the unrealistic 
riskless framework in the existing literature. Thus, the net interest portion 
of Wang’s service ﬂ  ow measure of nominal bank output can also be char-
acterized as total net income of the opportunity cost of funds, provided this 
opportunity cost is correctly adjusted for risk. (All agree that explicit fee 
income received is also part of nominal bank output.)
The GE model here veriﬁ  es the partial equilibrium conclusion reached by 
Wang (2003a). As in Wang (2003a), we use a user cost framework in which 
banks’ optimal choice of interest rates must cover the (risk- adjusted) oppor-
tunity cost of funds, as well as the cost of implicitly provided services. The 
primary contribution of our GE model is to endogenize the cost of funds, 
which Wang (2003a) takes as exogenously given by ﬁ  nancial markets.
Like SNA93, the 2003 U.S. National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPAs) benchmark revisions allocate the FISIM between borrowers and 
depositors using a reference rate. The NIPAs impute the nominal value of 
services to borrowers as the volume of interest- earning assets multiplied by 
the diﬀerence between the (average) lending rate and that reference rate—
the user cost of funds. Likewise, it imputes nominal output of services to 
depositors as the volume of deposits multiplied by the diﬀerence between 
that reference rate and the (average) deposit rate (Fixler, Reinsdorf, and 
Smith 2003).
2. SNA 1993, paragraph 6.125.
3. See, for example, Fixler and Zeischang (1992). Important contributors to the user cost 
approach also include Diewert (1974), Barnett (1978), and Hancock (1985).A General Equilibrium Approach to the Measurement of Bank Output    2 7 5
The challenge is to determine the appropriate reference rate or rates. The 
NIPAs use a basically risk-  free rate for both borrower and depositor ser-
vices. As in Wang (2003a), however, we show that the risk-  free rate is not 
appropriate for borrowers. Because the cost of funds is risk dependent, the 
reference rate must incorporate the systematic risk of a bank’s loan portfolio. 
Hence, the imputed value of banks’ implicit borrower services excludes the 
risk premium. The premium represents capital income to bank shareholders 
and uninsured debt holders for bearing the systematic risk on funds used in 
production outside the bank.
A simple example shows the intuition for excluding the risk premium 
from bank output and illustrates the shortcomings of the NIPAs approach. 
Consider two otherwise identical borrowers who seek to obtain additional 
ﬁ  nancing in a world with no transactions costs or informational asymme-
tries; one borrows in the bond market, the other borrows from a bank. The 
bond- ﬁ  nanced ﬁ  rm’s expected return equals the risk-  free rate plus a risk 
premium. It is clear that the entire return represents the value added of the 
borrower.
Now consider the bank- ﬁ  nanced ﬁ  rm. To keep things simple, suppose that 
banks hire no labor or capital and produce no services whatsoever. Banks 
are merely an accounting device that records loans (perhaps funded by bank 
shareholder equity) to borrowers. They are a perfect substitute for the bond 
market, so they charge the risk- free interest rate plus the same risk premium 
paid by the bond-  ﬁ  nanced ﬁ  rm: by construction, the risk is the same, and 
in equilibrium, there is no arbitrage. (Note that in equilibrium, bank share-
holders are indiﬀerent between buying the bonds or holding shares in the 
bank.) But NIPAs would attribute positive value added to a bank equal to 
the risk premium multiplied by the face value of the loan—even though, by 
assumption, the bank does nothing!
Conceptually, the two ﬁ  rms should be treated symmetrically: they are iden-
tical, apart from an arbitrary and (to the ﬁ  rm) irrelevant ﬁ  nancing choice. 
But under NIPAs conventions, they appear to have diﬀerent value added, 
inputs of ﬁ  nancial services, and productivities. In contrast, the approach 
we recommend would treat the two ﬁ  rms symmetrically by excluding the 
risk premium from the bank’s nominal ﬁ  nancial output—a premium the 
borrowing ﬁ  rm must pay, regardless of whether it is ﬁ  nanced by bonds or 
bank loans.
Thus, the national accounting measure leads to inconsistency, even in 
the very simplest of possible models, where banks produce no services that 
use real resources. Our model, as well as Wang’s (2003a), shows that the 
conceptual inconsistency extends to realistic cases, where banks provide 
actual services. The NIPAs measure corresponds to the empirically irrel-
evant special case, when either investors are risk neutral or bank loans have 
no systematic risk.
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is large. In 2001, commercial banks in the United States had nominal out-
put of $187 billion,4 of which half was ﬁ  nal consumption and half was 
intermediate services to businesses. Our theoretical results imply that the 
measured ﬁ  gures overstate true output; Wang (2003b) suggests that NIPAs 
banking output measures are about 20 percent too high. This ﬁ  gure reﬂ  ects 
both an overestimate of lending services provided to consumers (hence an 
overstatement of gross domestic product [GDP]) and an overestimate of 
intermediate services provided to ﬁ  rms (which does not overstate GDP but 
distorts measures of industry output and productivity).
Similar considerations apply to measuring the output of ﬁ  nancial services 
more generally, so the total NIPAs mismeasurement can be substantial. Fur-
thermore, the distortions aﬀect relative GDP measures across countries. For 
example, banking services account for 37 percent of Luxembourg’s exports, 
which in turn are 150 percent of GDP. Thus, our work suggests that Lux-
embourg’s GDP could be overstated by about 11 percent—substantial by 
any measure.
In addition, time variation in risk premia distorts growth rates (Wang 
2003b). The distortion is particularly large during transitions such as those 
taking place now. For example, as banks securitize a growing fraction of 
their loans, they move the risk premium oﬀ their books, even if they continue 
to provide substantially the same real services (e.g., screening and servicing 
loans). Several studies ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  nancial services contributed importantly to 
the post- 1995 U.S. productivity growth revival, so it is important to measure 
the growth as well as the level of these sectors’ outputs correctly.
The model provides additional insights. First, to measure real output (and 
hence the banking price deﬂ  ator), one wants to count just the productive 
activities of banks (such as those related to screening loans), not the (real) 
amounts of associated ﬁ  nancial assets (i.e., the loans). Importantly, the two 
are not generally in ﬁ  xed proportion to one another, so one cannot use the 
volume of loans as a proxy or indicator for the value of services. The model 
provides conceptual guidance on how to weight diﬀerent real services in 
the absence of clearly attributable nominal shares in cost or revenue. Sec-
ond, being dynamic, our model highlights the potential timing mismatch 
between when a service is performed (e.g., screening when a loan is origi-
nated) and when that service is compensated (with higher interest income 
over the life of the loan). Third, being stochastic, the model points out that 
the expected nominal output of monitoring (services that are performed 
during the lifetime of a loan, after it is originated) can be measured from 
ex ante interest rate spreads, but the actual monitoring services produced 
are diﬃcult to measure from ex post revenue ﬂ  ows. Finally, our service- ﬂ  ow 
perspective suggests major shortcomings of the book-  value output mea-
4. Figures are from Fixler, Reinsdorf, and Smith (2003) and reﬂ  ect the December 2003 com-
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sures that are universally used in the empirical microeconomic literature on 
bank eﬃciencies.
Our use of a DSGE model oﬀers several advantages for studying measure-
ment issues. First, national income accounting imposes a set of adding-  up 
constraints that must hold in the aggregate; GE models impose the same 
restrictions. By applying actual national income accounting procedures to 
the variables generated by the model, we can ask whether and under what 
conditions the objects measured in the national accounts correspond to the 
economic concepts we want to measure.
Second, and more speciﬁ  c to our current project, the study of banking 
intrinsically concerns both goods-  and asset- market interactions among dif-
ferent agents, which endogenously determine goods prices, quantities, and 
interest rates. This nexus of economic connections is naturally studied in a 
GE setting, which ensures the comprehensive consideration of all the key 
elements of an economy. For example, one needs to specify an environment 
in which intermediation is necessary: in the model, households cannot or 
will not lend directly to ﬁ  rms for well-  speciﬁ  ed informational reasons. We 
also need to specify how banks then produce real intermediation services 
and what determines required rates of return on bank assets.
The DSGE model endogenizes the risk premium on loans that fund 
business capital, as well as the required rate of return on banks’ equity. 
Our model follows Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler, 
and Gilchrist (1999), among others, but it explicitly models the screening 
and monitoring technology of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, which these authors 
use to resolve asymmetric information problems in investment. The model 
highlights the proper measurement of bank service output in both nominal 
and real terms.
We abstract from some activities banks undertake (mainly transactions 
services to depositors), as well as from realistic complications (e.g., deposit 
insurance and taxes). These abstractions, which could be incorporated, are 
unlikely to interact in important ways with the issues we address here. For 
example, our approach extends naturally to valuing activities by banks other 
than making loans and taking deposits, such as underwriting derivatives 
contracts and other exotic ﬁ  nancial instruments; we present one such ex-
ample. Thus, we begin the process of bringing measurement into line with 
the new roles that banks play in modern economies, as discussed, for ex-
ample, by Allen and Santomero (1998, 1999).
One might worry that results from our bare- bones model do not apply to 
the far more complex real world. But our model provides a controlled set-
ting, where we know exactly what interactions take place and what outcomes 
result. Even in this relatively simple setting, current methods of measuring 
nominal and real bank output generate inconsistent results that can be eco-
nomically substantial. It is implausible that these methods will magically 
succeed in the far more complex world.278    J.  Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
The chapter has four main sections. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 present the 
basic setup of the model with minimal technicality to build intuition for 
the economic reasoning behind our conclusions. (The rigorous solution of 
the model is included in the appendix.) Section 7.1 solves the model with 
symmetric information between borrowers and lenders and uses this simple 
setup to show by example the ﬂ  aws in existing proposals for measuring bank 
output. Section 7.2 introduces asymmetric information and assumes that 
banks and rating agencies have a technological advantage in resolving such 
asymmetries. We derive the correct, model-  based measure of bank output 
in this setting, where ﬁ  nancial institutions provide real services. Section 7.3 
discusses implications of the model for measuring nominal and real ﬁ  nancial 
sector output. Section 7.4 discusses extensions, and section 7.5 concludes 
and suggests priorities for future research and data collection.
7.1      The Model with Symmetric Information
7.1.1    Overview
Our model has three groups of agents: households, who supply labor and 
who ultimately own the economy’s capital; entrepreneurs, who hire workers 
and buy capital to operate projects; and competitive ﬁ  nancial institutions 
(banks and rating agencies), which resolve information problems between 
the owners and the ﬁ  nal users of capital. It also has a bond market in which 
entrepreneurs can issue corporate debt.
First, households are the only savers in this economy and thus are the ulti-
mate owners of all capital. Their preferences determine the risk premium on 
all ﬁ  nancial assets in the economy, and their accumulated saving determines 
the amount of capital available for entrepreneurs to rent in a given period.
Second, entrepreneurs operate projects that produce the economy’s ﬁ  nal 
output. There is only one homogeneous ﬁ  nal good, sold in a competitive 
market, that can be consumed or invested. Entrepreneurs’ projects diﬀer 
from one another because the entrepreneurs diﬀer in their ability levels (or 
equivalently, in the intrinsic productivity of their projects). The technology 
for producing ﬁ  nal goods in any project has constant returns to scale. Thus, 
without asymmetric information, the social optimum would be to give all 
the capital to the most eﬃcient project. But we assume that due to asym-
metric information problems, entrepreneurs face a supply curve for funds 
that is convex in the amount borrowed.5 We also assume that entrepreneurs 
are born without wealth—they are the proverbial impoverished geniuses, 
5. Given that all entrepreneurs are borrowing without collateral, this seems quite realistic. 
Our speciﬁ  c modeling assumption is that the cost of screening is convex in the size of the project, 
but other assumptions—such as leveraging each entrepreneur’s net worth with debt—would 
also lead to this result. See Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).A General Equilibrium Approach to the Measurement of Bank Output    2 7 9
whose heads are full of ideas but whose purses hold only air—so that one 
way or another, they will need to obtain funds from households.
The focus of this chapter is on how the entrepreneurs obtain the funds for 
investment from households and on the role of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries in 
the process. A large literature on ﬁ  nancial intermediation explains (in partial 
equilibrium) ﬁ  nancial institutions’ role as being to resolve informational 
asymmetries between the ultimate suppliers of funds (i.e., the households 
in our model) and the users of funds (i.e., the entrepreneurs who borrow 
to buy capital and produce). We incorporate this result into our general 
equilibrium model.6
We consider both types of information asymmetry—hidden information 
and hidden actions. Households face adverse selection ex ante as they try 
to select projects to ﬁ  nance: they know less about the projects (e.g., default 
probabilities under various economic conditions) than the entrepreneurs, 
who have an incentive to understate the risk of their projects. Moral hazard 
arises ex post, as savers cannot perfectly observe borrowers’ actions (e.g., 
diverting project revenue for their own consumption).
Thus, the third group of actors in our model are institutions such as banks 
that exist (in the model and largely in practice) to mitigate these informa-
tional problems.7 We focus on two speciﬁ  c services they provide: (a) screen-
ing to lessen (in our model, to eliminate) entrepreneurs’ private information 
about the viability of their projects and (b) monitoring project outcomes 
(e.g., auditing after a default) to discover entrepreneurs’ hidden actions.8 To 
conduct screening and monitoring, intermediaries engage in a production 
process that uses real resources of labor, capital, and an underlying tech-
nology. The production process is qualitatively similar to producing other 
information services, such as consulting and data processing.9
We call the ﬁ  nancial intermediaries banks mainly for convenience, al-
though the functions they perform have traditionally been central to the 
activities of commercial banks. But the analysis is general, as we will show 
6. Most general equilibrium models of growth or business cycles abstract from this issue: 
implicitly, households own and operate the ﬁ  rms directly, so there are no principal- agent prob-
lems.
7. Financial institutions prevent market breakdown (such as in Akerlof [1970]) but cannot 
eliminate deadweight loss. Another major function of banks is to provide services to deposi-
tors, as discussed in the introduction. But we omit them from the formal model, because their 
measurement is less controversial and has no bearing on our conclusion about how to treat 
risk in measuring lending services. Yet, we note practical measurement issues about them in 
section 7.3.
8. Many studies, all partial equilibrium, analyze the nature and operation of ﬁ  nancial inter-
mediaries. See, for example, Leland and Pyle (1977), who model banks’ role as resolving ex ante 
adverse selection in lending; Diamond (1984) studies delegated monitoring through banks; 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) look at nondepository institutions.
9. Only a handful of studies analyze the eﬀects of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries on real activities 
in a general equilibrium framework. None of them, however, consider explicitly the issue of 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries’ output associated with the process of screening and monitoring, nor 
the properties of the screening and monitoring technology.280    J.  Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
that loans subject to default are equivalent to a risk-  free bond plus a put 
option. So, our analysis also applies to implicit bank services associated with 
other ﬁ  nancial instruments, as well as to other types of intermediaries, such 
as rating agencies and ﬁ  nance companies. We assume that banks and other 
ﬁ  nancial service providers are owned by households and are not subject to 
informational asymmetries with respect to households.10
As suppliers of funds, households demand an expected rate of return, 
commensurate with the systematic risk of their assets. This is of course true 
in any reasonable model with investor risk aversion, regardless of whether 
there are informational asymmetries. Banks must ensure that the interest rate 
charged compensates their owners, the households, with the risk-  adjusted 
return in expectation. Banks must also ensure that they charge explicit or 
implicit fees to cover the costs incurred by screening and monitoring.
The primary focus of this chapter is on how to correctly measure the 
nominal and real service output provided by these banks, when the services 
are not charged explicitly, but rather are charged implicitly in the form of 
higher interest rates. Hence, we need to detail the nature of the contract 
between entrepreneurs and banks, because that determines the interest rates 
banks charge. Indeed, most of the complexity in the formal model in the 
appendix comes from the diﬃculty of solving for the interest rate charged 
under the optimal debt contract and from decomposing total interest income 
into a compensation for bank services—screening and monitoring—and a 
risk- adjusted return for the capital that households channel to ﬁ  rms through 
the bank. The payoﬀ from this complexity is that the model provides deﬁ  nite 
insights on key measurement issues.
For the most part, we try to specify the incentives and preferences of 
the three groups of agents in a simple way in order to focus on the com-
plex interactions among the agents. We now summarize the key elements 
of the incentives and preferences of each agent to give the reader a working 
knowledge of the economic environment. We then derive the key ﬁ  rst-  order 
conditions for the optimal pricing of risky assets, which must hold in any 
equilibrium, to draw implications from the model that are crucial for mea-
surement purposes. At the end of this section, the reader may proceed to 
the detailed discussion of the model found in the appendix or may proceed 
to section 7.3 to study the implications for measurement.
7.1.2    Households
We assume households are inﬁ  nitely lived and risk averse. For most of 
the chapter, we assume that households can invest their wealth only through 
a ﬁ  nancial intermediary, because they lack the ability to resolve informa-
tion asymmetries with entrepreneurs directly. In contrast, households own 
10. We could extend our model to allow for this two-  tier information asymmetry at the cost 
of considerable added complexity. We conjecture, however, that our qualitative results would 
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and have no informational problems with respect to the intermediaries. All 
households are identical, and they maximize the expected present value of 
lifetime utility—expressed here in terms of a representative household:












subject to the budget constraint:
(2)  Ct
H   W tNt   
t ∏   R ˜H
t 1Xt   Xt 1.
The variable Ct
H is the household’s consumption, Nt is its labor supply, and 
  is the discount factor. The variable Et(.) is the expectation, given the infor-
mation set at time t. We assume that the utility function V(.) is concave and 
that V (0)    . The variable Wt is the wage rate, Xt is the household’s total 
assets (equal to the capital stock in equilibrium), and t is pure economic 
proﬁ  t received from ownership of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries (equal to zero in 
equilibrium because we assume that this sector is competitive). The vari-
able R ˜H
t 1 is the ex post gross return on the household’s asset portfolio (real 
capital, lent to various agents to enable production in the economy). Cor-
responding to the ex post return is an expected return—the required rate of 
return on risky assets, which we denote RH
t 1. This is a key interest rate in the 
following sections, so we discuss it further.
We deﬁ  ne the intertemporal pricing kernel (also called the stochastic dis-
count factor), mt 1, as
(3)  mt 1  
 V c(CH
t 1, 1   Nt 1)
   
V c(Ct
H, 1   Nt)
,
where V C is the partial derivative of utility with respect to consumption. 
In this notation, the Euler equation for consumption (which is also a basic 
asset-  pricing equation in the consumption capital asset-  pricing model 
[CCAPM]) is:
(4)  Et(mt 1R ˜H
t 1)   1.
Now suppose a one-  period asset, whose return is risk free because it is 
known in advance. Clearly, for this asset, the rate of return Rf
t 1 satisﬁ  es 
Et(mt 1Rf
t 1)   Rf
t 1Et(mt 1)   1. So,
(5)  Rf




As is standard in a CCAPM, the Euler equation (3) allows us to derive the 
risk- free rate, even if no such asset exists—which is the case in our economy, 
where the only asset is risky capital.11
11. For more discussion, see chapter 2 in Cochrane (2001).282    J.  Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
From equations (4) and (5), the gross required (expected) rate of return 
on the risky asset, RH
t 1, is:
(6)  RH
t 1  Et(R ˜H
t 1)   Rf
t 1[1   covt(mt 1, R ˜H
t 1)],
where covt is the covariance, conditional on the information set at time t. 
The risk premium then equals
 R H
t 1   Rf
t 1    Rf
t 1 covt(mt 1, R ˜H
t 1).
Note that when RH
t 1 is the required rate of return on debt (e.g., loans) 
subject to the risk of borrower default, there is a subtle but important con-
ceptual diﬀerence between RH
t 1 and the interest rate (the so-  called yield for 
corporate bonds) that is charged on loans—the rate that a borrower must 
pay if not in default. To illustrate in a simple example, suppose there is 
probability p that a borrower will pay the interest rate charged (call it Rt 1) 
and probability (1 –   p) otherwise, in which case lenders get nothing. Then, 
Rt 1 must satisfy
 p  · Rt 1   (1   p) · 0   RH
t 1  ⇒  Rt 1   





So, Rt 1 exceeds the required return RH
t 1; the margin Rt 1 –   RH
t 1 is the so- 
called default premium. Thus, Rt 1 diﬀers from the risk-  free rate for two 
reasons. First, there is the default premium. The borrower repays less to 
nothing in bad states of the world, so he must pay more in good states 
to ensure an adequate average return. Second, there is a risk premium, as 
previously shown. The risk premium exists if the probability of default is 
correlated with consumption (or more precisely, with the marginal utility 
of consumption). If defaults occur when consumption is already low, then 
they are particularly costly in utility terms. Thus, the consumer requires an 
extra return, on average, to compensate for bearing this systematic, nondi-
versiﬁ  able risk.
In addition to the intertemporal Euler equation, consumer optimiza-
tion requires a static trade-  oﬀ between consumption and leisure within a 
period:
(7)  W tV C(Ct
H, 1   Nt)    V N(Ct
H, 1   Nt).
In equilibrium, households’ assets equal the total capital stock of the 
economy: Xt   Kt. The capital stock evolves in the usual way:
 K t 1   (1    )Kt   It.
Capital is used by intermediaries to produce real ﬁ  nancial services or is 
rented by ﬁ  rms for production.12
12. Because we have assumed identical households, we abstract from lending among house-
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7.1.3    Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur owns and manages a nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm that invests 
in one project, producing the single homogeneous ﬁ  nal good and selling 
it in a perfectly competitive market. So entrepreneur, ﬁ  rm, and project are 
all equivalent and interchangeable in this model. Entrepreneurs are a set 
of agents, distinct from households in that each lives for only two periods, 
which coincides with the duration of a project. Thus, there are two overlap-
ping generations of entrepreneurs in each period. The number of entrepre-
neurs who are born and die each period is constant, so the fraction of entre-
preneurs is constant in the total population of agents. The reason for having 
short-  lived entrepreneurs in the economy is to create a need for external 
ﬁ  nancing and thus the screening and monitoring by ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. 
Long-  lived entrepreneurs could accumulate enough assets to self-  ﬁ  nance 
all investment, without borrowing from households. In addition, by having 
each borrower interact with lenders only once, we avoid complex supergame 
Nash equilibria, where entrepreneurs try to develop a reputation for being 
good risks in order to obtain better terms from lenders.
We assume that entrepreneurs, like households, are risk averse.13 But we 
abstract from the issue of risk sharing and assume that the sole income 
an entrepreneur receives is the residual project return, if any, net of debt 
repayment.14 That also means entrepreneurs have no initial endowment.15 
In choosing project size in the ﬁ  rst period, entrepreneurs seek to maximize 
their expected utility from consumption in the second period, which is the 
only period in which they consume. Thus, the utility of entrepreneur i born 
at time t is
(8)  U(CE,i
t 1),
where U    0, U    0, and U(0)   0. We denote entrepreneurs’ aggregate 
consumption by Ct
E, which is the sum over i of Ct
E,i.
Firms diﬀer only in their exogenous technology parameters. We denote 
13. If entrepreneurs were risk neutral, they would insure the households against all aggregate 
shocks, leading to a degenerate—and counterfactual—outcome, where lenders of funds would 
face no aggregate risk.
14. In fact, this model implicitly allows for the sharing of project- speciﬁ  c risk (i.e., zi) across 
entrepreneurs (e.g., through a mutual insurance contract covering all entrepreneurs), as all the 
results would remain qualitatively the same. The model assumes that there is no risk sharing 
between entrepreneurs and households, because the only contract that lenders oﬀer borrowers 
is a standard debt contract. Given our desire to study banks, this assumption is realistic.
15. The assumption of zero endowment is mainly to simplify the analysis. Introducing partial 
internal funds (e.g., with entrepreneurs’ own labor income) aﬀects none of the model’s conclu-
sions. One potential problem with zero internal funds is that it gives entrepreneurs incentive 
to take excessive risk (i.e., adopting projects with a high payoﬀ when successful but possibly 
a negative net present value), but we rule out such cases by assumption. The usual principal-
  agent problem between shareholders and managers does not arise here because entrepreneurs 
are the owners-  operators.284    J.  Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
the parameter Ai
t 1 for a ﬁ  rm i created in period t, because the owner pro-
duces in the second period—t   1. We assume that Ai
t 1   ziAt 1, where 
At 1 is the stochastic aggregate technology level in period t   1, and zi is the 
idiosyncratic productivity level of i, drawn at time t when the owner is born. 
The variable zi is assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
across ﬁ  rms and time, with bounded support, and independent of At 1, with 
E(zi)   1. Conditional on zi, the ﬁ  rm borrows to buy capital from the house-
holds at the end of period t. In keeping with our desire to study banking 
operation in detail, we assume that lenders oﬀer borrowers a standard debt 
contract. (We discuss the borrowing process, ﬁ  rst under symmetric infor-
mation and then under asymmetric information, in the next several sub-
sections.)
The aggregate technology level (At 1) is revealed at the start of period 
t   1, and it determines Ai
t 1(  ziAt 1). But because At 1 is unknown when 
the capital purchase decision is made, there is a risk involved for both the 
borrower and the lender. Conditional on Ai
t 1 and the precommitted level of 
capital input, the ﬁ  rm hires the optimal amount of labor at the going wage 
of time (t   1) and produces the ﬁ  nal good. Entrepreneurs ﬁ  rst pay their 
workers, then pay the agreed upon interest to households (as well as return 
the loan principal, the value of the stock of capital rented for production), 
and then consume all the output leftover.
If a bad realization of At 1 leaves an entrepreneur unable to cover the gross 
interest on his borrowed funds, he declares bankruptcy. The lenders (house-
holds) seize all of the assets and output of the ﬁ  rm leftover after paying the 
workers, which will be shown to be less than what the lenders are owed and 
expect to consume. Entrepreneurs are left with zero consumption—less than 
what they expected as well. The risk to both borrowers and lenders is driven 
by the aggregate uncertainty of the stochastic technology, A.
7.1.4      Equilibrium with Symmetric Information
In order to make an important point about the SNA93 method for mea-
suring nominal bank output, we ﬁ  rst consider a case where households can 
costlessly observe all ﬁ  rms’ idiosyncratic productivity, zi.
We assume that the production function of each potential project has 
constant returns to scale (CRS):
(9)  Yi
t   Atzi(Ki
t) (Ni
t)1  .
Given CRS production, households will want to lend all their capital only 
to the entrepreneur with the highest level of z—or to paraphrase in market 
terms, the entrepreneur with the highest productivity will be willing and able 
to outbid all the others and to hire all the capital in the economy. (We assume 
that he or she will act competitively, taking prices as given, rather than act 
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We deﬁ  ne z    maxi{zi}.16 Then, the economy’s aggregate production func-
tion will be (that of z ):
 Y t   Atz Kt
 Nt
1  .
The entrepreneur with the z  level of productivity will hire capital at time 
t to maximize





    (Rt 1   1    )Kt 1   W t 1Nt 1, 0]}.
The expression in equation (10) indicates that the entrepreneur gets either 
the residual proﬁ  ts from his project if he is not bankrupt or gets nothing if 
he has to declare bankruptcy.
The labor choice will be based on the realization of At 1 and the market 
wage and will be
(11)  Nt 1   
(1    )z At 1   
W t 1 
1/ 
Kt 1.
Production, capital and labor payments, and consumption will take place 
as outlined in the previous subsection. Note that producing at the highest 
available level of z does not mean that bankruptcy will never take place or 
even that it will necessarily be less likely. Ceteris paribus, a higher expected 
productivity of capital raises the expected return RH
t 1 but does not eliminate 
the possibility of bankruptcy conditional on that higher-  required return.17 
Thus, debt will continue to carry a risk premium relative to the risk-  free 
rate.
The national income accounts identity in this economy is
Y t   Ct
H   Ct
E   It.
7.1.5      The Bank That Does Nothing
There is no bank in the economy summarized in the previous subsec-
tion, nor is there any need for one. Households lend directly to ﬁ  rms at a 
required rate of return RH
t 1. Suppose, however, a bank is formed simply as 
an accounting device. Households transfer their capital stock to banks, and 
in return, they own bank equity. The bank rents the capital to the single most 
productive ﬁ  rm at the competitive market price.
Because households see through the veil of the bank to the underlying 
16. The maximum is ﬁ  nite because we have assumed the z has a bounded support.
17. Let us assume, as in section 7.2, that a continuum of entrepreneurs is born every period, 
so we are guaranteed that z  is always the upper end of the support of zi. Then, all that hap-
pens by choosing the most productive ﬁ  rm every period is that the mean level of technology is 
higher than if we chose any other ﬁ  rm (e.g., the average ﬁ  rm). But nothing in our derivations 
turns on the mean of A; it is simply a scaling factor for the overall size of the economy, which 
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assets the bank holds—risky debt issued by the entrepreneur—they will 
demand the same return (i.e., RH
t 1) on bank equity as they did on the debt in 
the economy without a bank. Because the bank acts competitively (and thus 
makes zero proﬁ  t), it will lend the funds at marginal cost (expected return of 
RH
t 1, hence a contractual interest rate of Rt 1) to the ﬁ  rm, which will then 
face the same cost of capital as before.
However, applying the SNA93 calculation for FISIM to this model econ-
omy, the value added of bank, eﬀected via book entries of the capital trans-
fer (the only sign of the bank’s existence here), would be
(Rt
H   Rf
t)Kt.
The variable Kt is the value of bank assets, as well as the economy-  wide 
capital stock. Thus, by using the risk-  free rate as the opportunity cost of 
funds instead of the correct risk- adjusted interest rate, the current procedure 
attributes positive value added to the bank that in fact produces nothing.18
At the same time, from the expenditure side, the value of national income 
will be unchanged—still equal to Yt—because the bank output (if any) is 
used as an intermediate input of service by ﬁ  rms producing the ﬁ  nal good.19 
But industry values added are mismeasured: for a given aggregate output, 
the productive sector has to have lower value added in order to oﬀset the 
value added incorrectly attributed to the banking industry. Clearly, the pro-
duction sector’s true value added is all of Yt, but it will be measured, incor-
rectly, as:
Y t   (Rt
H   Rf
t)Kt.
Thus, the general lesson from this example is that whenever banks make 
loans that incur aggregate risk (i.e., risk that cannot be diversiﬁ  ed away), 
the current national accounting approach attributes too much of aggregate 
value added to the banking industry and too little to the ﬁ  rms that borrow 
from banks. This basic insight carries over to the more realistic cases next, 
where banks do in fact produce real services.
We shall also argue later that our simplifying assumption of a fully 
  equity-  funded bank is completely unessential to the result. The reason is 
that in our setting, the theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958; hereafter 
MM) applies to banks. The MM theorem proves that a ﬁ  rm’s cost of capital 
is independent of its capital structure. Thus, the bank that does nothing 
can ﬁ  nance itself by issuing debt (taking deposits) as well as equity, without 
18. Financial intermediation services indirectly measured (FISIM) also impute a second 
piece of bank output—depositor services. But because bank deposits are zero in our model, 
FISIM would correctly calculate this component of output to be zero.
19. Mismeasuring banking output would distort GDP if banks’ output is used as a ﬁ  nal 
good (e.g., lending and depository services to consumers, or perhaps more importantly, net 
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changing the previous result in the slightest, either qualitatively or quanti-
tatively.20
Even in more realistic settings, the lesson in this subsection is directly 
relevant for one issue in the measurement of bank output. Banks buy and 
passively hold risky market assets, as in the example here. Even though 
banks typically hold assets with relatively low risk, such assets (e.g., high-
  grade corporate bonds) still oﬀer rates of return that exceed the risk-  free 
rate, sometimes by a nontrivial margin. Whenever a bank holds market 
securities that oﬀer an average return higher than the current reference rate, 
it creates a cash ﬂ  ow—the diﬀerence between the securities’ return and the 
safe return, multiplied by the market value of the securities held—that the 
current procedure improperly classiﬁ  es as bank output.
7.2      Asymmetric Information and a Financial Sector 
That Produces Real Services
7.2.1      Resolving Asymmetric Information I: 
Nonbank Financial Institutions
Now we assume, more realistically, that information is in fact asymmet-
ric. Entrepreneurs know their idiosyncratic productivity and actual output, 
but households cannot observe them directly. In this case, as we know from 
Akerlof (1970), the ﬁ  nancial market will become less eﬃcient and may break 
down altogether.
We introduce two new institutions into our model. The ﬁ  rst is a rating 
agency, which screens potential borrowers and monitors those who default 
to alleviate the asymmetric information problems. The other is a bond 
market; that is, a portfolio of corporate debt. The two combined fulﬁ  ll the 
function of channeling funds from households to entrepreneurs so that the 
latter can invest. Both institutions have real-  world counterparts, which will 
be important when we turn to our model’s implications for output mea-
surement.
The purpose of introducing these two new institutions will become clear 
in the next subsection when we compare them with banks. There, we will 
show that a bank can be decomposed into a rating agency plus a portfolio 
of corporate debt, and the real output of banks—informational services—is 
equivalent to the output of the agency alone. Thus, it makes sense to under-
stand the two pieces individually before studying the sum of the two. Under-
standing the determination of bond market interest rates is particularly 
20. This is assuming there is no deposit insurance. See Wang (2003a) for a full treatment of 
banks’ capital structure with risk and deposit insurance. Of course, in the real world, taxes 
and transactions costs break the pure irrelevance result of Modigliani-  Miller. But the basic 
lesson—that the reference rate must take risk into account—is unaﬀected by these realistic but 
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important when we discuss measurement, because we shall argue that cor-
porate debt with the same risk- return characteristics as bank loans provides 
the appropriate risk-  adjusted reference rate for measuring bank output.
We discuss rating agencies ﬁ  rst. These are institutions with specialized 
technology for assessing the quality (i.e., productivity) of prospective proj-
ects, and they are also able to assess the value of assets if a ﬁ  rm goes bank-
rupt. Thus, these institutions are similar to the rating agencies found in the 
real world, such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, which not only rate 
new issues of corporate bonds but also monitor old issues.
The technology of each rating agency for screening (S) and monitoring 
(M) is as follows:
(12)  Yt
JA   At
J(Kt
JA) J(Nt
JA)1  J, J   M or S.
We use the superscript A to denote prices and output of the agency. The 
variables Kt
JA and Nt
JA are the capital and labor, respectively, used in the two 
activities. The variables At
M and At
S diﬀer when the pace of technological pro-
gress diﬀers between the two activities. Diﬀerence between output elasticities 
of capital  M and  S means that neither kind of task can be accomplished 
by simply scaling the production process of the other task.
We assume there are many agencies in a competitive market, so the price 
of their services equals the marginal cost of production. The representative 
rating agency solves the following value maximization problem:



































MA   At
M(Kt
MA) M(Nt
MA)1  M, and Y0
MA   0,
(16)  Nt
A   Nt
SA   Nt
MA, and Kt
A   Kt
SA   Kt
MA,
(17)  KA
t 1   Kt
A(1    )   It
A.
In equation (13), Yt
SA and Yt
MA are the rating agency’s respective output 
of screening and monitoring services. The variables ft
S and ft
M are the cor-
responding prices (mnemonic: fees), and as assumed, are equal to the re-
spective marginal cost. The variable Wt is the real wage rate, and Nt
A is the 
agency’s total labor input. Equations (14) and (15) are the production func-
tions for screening and monitoring, respectively, with the inputs deﬁ  ned as in 
equation (12). Total labor and capital inputs are given in equation (16), and 
equation (17) describes the law of motion for the agency’s total capital.
The agency is fully equity funded. Thus, the discount rate for the agency’s 
value maximization problem (i.e., Rt
SV [SV standing for services]) is exactly 
its shareholders’ required rate of return on equity. The variable Rt
SV, analo-
gous to RH
t 1 in equation (6), thus is determined by the systematic risk of A General Equilibrium Approach to the Measurement of Bank Output    2 8 9
the agency’s entire cash ﬂ  ow. According to the pricing equation (6), and 




    Rf
t 11   covtmt 1, 











t 1) in the covariance is the agency’s capital used in 
production at time t   1, funded by its shareholders at time t. The numera-
tor is the ex post return on that capital, consisting of its operating proﬁ  ts 
(revenue minus labor costs), plus the return of the depreciated capital lent 
by the stockholders at time t.21
Even though the agency is paid contemporaneously for its services, the 
fact that it must choose its capital stock a period in advance creates uncer-
tainty about the cash ﬂ  ow accruing to the owners of its capital. This uncer-
tainty arises fundamentally because the demand for screening and monitor-
ing is random, driven by the stochastic process for aggregate technology, At 1. 
Thus, the implicit rental rate of physical capital in period t for this agency is 
(Rt
SV –   1    ),22 where Rt
SV will generally diﬀer from the risk-  free rate.
Because a rating agency is of little use unless one can borrow on the basis 
of a favorable rating, we assume that a ﬁ  rm can issue bonds of the appropri-
ate interest rate in the bond market once it is rated. That is, once an agency 
ﬁ  nishes screening a ﬁ  rm’s project, it issues a certiﬁ  cate that reveals the proj-
ect’s type (i.e., zi). Armed with this certiﬁ  cate, ﬁ  rms sell bonds to households 
in the market, oﬀering contractual rates of interest Ri
t 1 that vary according 
to each ﬁ  rm’s risk rating. The variable Ri
t 1 depends on households’ required 
rate of return on risky debt, but Ri
t 1 is not the required return per se. The two 
diﬀer by the default premium, as discussed in subsection 7.1.2. (Determining 
the appropriate interest rate to charge an entrepreneur of type i is a complex 
calculation, in part because the probability of default is endogenous to the 
interest rate charged. We thus defer this derivation to the appendix.)
There is an additional complication: because entrepreneurs are born with-
out wealth, they are unable to pay their screening fees up front. Instead, they 
must borrow the fee from the bond market, in addition to the capital they 
plan to use for production next period, and must dash back to the rating 
agency within the period to pay the fee they owe. In the second period, they 
must pay the bondholders a gross return on the borrowed productive capital, 
plus a same return on the fee that was borrowed to pay the agency.
21. The payoﬀ to the shareholder depends, of course, on the marginal product of capital. 
The assumption of constant- returns, Cobb- Douglas production functions allows us to express 
the result in terms of the more intuitive average return to capital. Note that the capital return 
in equation (18) is actually an average of the marginal revenue products of capital in screening 
and monitoring, with the weights being the share of capital devoted to each activity.
22. Recall that all R variables are gross interest rates, so the net interest rate r   R –   1.290    J.  Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
In the second period of his or her life, after his or her productivity is deter-
mined by the realization of At 1, an entrepreneur may approach his or her 
bondholders and inform them that his or her project was unproductive and 
that he or she is unable to repay his or her debt with interest. The households 
cannot assess the validity of this claim directly. Instead, they must engage 
the services of the rating agency to value the ﬁ  rm (its output plus residual 
capital). The agency charges a fee equal to its marginal cost, as determined 
by the maximization problem in equations (13) through (17). We assume 
that the agency can assess the value of the ﬁ  rm perfectly. Whenever a rating 
agency’s services are engaged, the bondholders get to keep the entire value 
of the project after paying the agency its monitoring fee.23 The entrepreneur 
gets nothing. Under these circumstances, the entrepreneur always tells the 
truth and only claims to be bankrupt when that is in fact the case.
Note that in this asymmetric information environment, entrepreneurs 
require additional inputs of real ﬁ  nancial services from the agencies to 
obtain capital. The production function for gross output for a ﬁ  rm of type 
i is still given by equation (9). But now, entrepreneurs have two additional 
costs. In the ﬁ  rst period, when they borrow capital, they must buy certain 
units of certiﬁ  cation services. The amount of screening varies with the size of 
the project (see the appendix for a detailed discussion of the size dependence 
of these information processing costs). A project of size Ki
t 1 needs υt
S(Ki
t 1) 




t 1) units of monitoring services, where ZM equals one if the 
ﬁ  rm defaults and equals zero otherwise. Functions υS(.) and υM(.) determine 
how many units of screening, and possibly monitoring, are needed for a 
project of size Ki. Either υS(.) or υM(.) is strictly convex, and this eﬀectively 
leads ﬁ  rms to have diminishing returns to scale.24 Thus, it is no longer opti-
mal to put all the capital at the most productive ﬁ  rm, and the equilibrium 
involves production by a strictly positive measure of ﬁ  rms.




t 1)1     (Ri
t 1    )Ki









t 1 is the contractual interest rate appropriate for a project of 
type i—the analogue to the full information contractual rate for the high-
est productivity project in equation (10). As in the situation with perfect 
information, either the entrepreneur gets positive residual proﬁ  ts, or he or 
she declares bankruptcy and gets nothing.
23. We assume that a project always has a gross return large enough to pay the fee. This 
assumption seems reasonable—even Enron’s bankruptcy value was high enough to pay similar 
costs (amounting to over one billion dollars).
24. A convex cost of capital is needed to obtain ﬁ  nite optimal project scale; we discuss this 
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We deﬁ  ne R ˜Ki
t 1 as the ex post gross return on capital for the project. It is 
the project’s total output net of labor cost and depreciation, (R ˜Ki
t 1 –   1)Ki
t 1 
  Yi
t 1 –  Wt 1Ni
t∗
 1 –   Ki
t 1, where Ni
t∗
 1 is the optimal quantity of labor. Thus, 
the ex ante required rate of return on the bonds issued by ﬁ  rm i, RLi
t 1, is the 
required return implied by the asset-  pricing equation
(19) 
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t 1)]    1.
So, as usual, RLi
t 1 depends on the conditional covariance between the cash 
ﬂ  ow and the stochastic discount factor. The expression in the numerator 
of the fraction is the state-  contingent payoﬀ to bondholders. If the reali-
zation of technology (At 1) is suﬃciently favorable, then the project will 
not default (i.e., ZM   0), and the bondholders will receive the contractual 
interest promised by the bond—Ri
t 1[Ki
t 1   ft
SυS(Ki
t 1)]. Otherwise, if the 
realization of technology is bad enough, the ﬁ  rm will have to declare bank-
ruptcy, and bondholders will receive the full value of the ﬁ  rm, net of the 
monitoring cost—[R ˜Ki
t 1Ki
t 1 –  fM
t 1υM(Ki
t 1)]. The contracted interest rate on 
the bond issued by a project (Ri
t 1) depends on its ex ante required rate of 
return RLi
t 1, which in turn depends on the risk characteristics of that project. 
For details, see the appendix.
The denominator of equation (19) is the total amount of resources the 
ﬁ  rm borrows from households. The variable Ki
t 1 is the capital used for 
production, while ft
SυS(Ki
t 1) is the screening fee. As discussed previously, 
entrepreneurs need to borrow to pay the screening fees, because they have 
no endowments in the ﬁ  rst period of their lives.
In general, households will hold a portfolio of bonds, not just one. For 
comparison in the next subsection with the case of a bank, it will be useful to 
derive the required return on this portfolio. Because each bond return must 
satisfy equation (19), we can write the return to the portfolio as a weighted 
average of the individual returns. Then, for a large portfolio of inﬁ  nitesimal 
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where the integral is taken over all ﬁ  rms whose bonds are in the investor’s 
portfolio.25
25. To illustrate the derivation, consider an example of discreet projects. Suppose a lender 
holds bonds from N ﬁ rms. Equation (19) holds for every ﬁ  rm i and can be rearranged by pulling 
the denominator Ki
t 1   ft
SυS(Ki
t 1) outside the expectations sign, because it is known at time 
t. Then, multiply each ﬁ  rm’s equation (19) by the ﬁ  rm’s share in the aggregate resources bor-
rowed (i.e., [Ki
t 1   ft
SυS(Ki
t 1)]/  ∑
N
i 1[Ki
t 1   ft
Sυ(Ki
t 1)]), and add up the N resulting equations. 292    J.  Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
7.2.2      Resolving Asymmetric Information II: 
Banks That Produce Real Services
We are ﬁ  nally ready to discuss bank operations. Now the banking sector 
performs real services, unlike the accounting device in subsection 7.1.5. We 
assume that banks assess the credit risk of prospective borrowers and lend 
them capital, and if a borrower claims to be unable to repay, banks investi-
gate, liquidate the assets, and keep the proceeds. That is, in our model—and 
in the world—banks perform the functions of rating agencies and the bond 
market under one roof. As important, especially for measurement purpose, 
note that banks, rating agencies, and the bond market all coexist, both in the 
model and in reality. Our banks are completely equity funded.26 They issue 
stocks in exchange for households’ capital. Part of the capital is used to gen-
erate screening and monitoring services, with exactly the same technology as 
in equation (12). The rest of the capital is lent to qualiﬁ  ed entrepreneurs. At 
time t, a bank must make an ex ante decision to split its total available capi-
tal into in-  house capital (used by the bank for producing services in period 
t   1, denoted KB
t 1) and loanable capital (lent to entrepreneurs, used to 
produce the ﬁ  nal good in period t   1). Because the banking sector is com-
petitive, banks price their package of services at marginal cost.
The exact statement of the bank’s value maximization problem is tedious 
and yields little additional insight, so it, too, is deferred to the appendix. In 
summary, entrepreneurs are shown to be indiﬀerent between approaching 
the bank for funds or going to a rating agency and then to the bond market,27 
given that banks have the same screening and monitoring technology as the 
agency (production functions in equations [14] and [15]).
Instead, in the rest of this section, we illustrate the intuition of the model’s 
conclusion—a bank’s cash ﬂ  ow equivalent to that of a rating agency plus a 
bond portfolio—and its implication for bank output measure.
First, we describe a bank’s total cash ﬂ  ow. At any time t, banks cannot 
charge explicit fees for the service of screening young entrepreneurs’ appli-
cations for funds, because the applicants have no initial wealth. Instead, 
banks have to allow the fees to be paid in the next period and must obtain 
additional equity in the current period to ﬁ  nance the production costs of 
The right-  hand side clearly sums up to one, while   ∑
N
i 1[Ki
t 1   ft
Sυ(Ki
t 1)] becomes the com-
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t 1Ki
t 1 –   fM
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t 1   ft
Sυ(Ki
t 1)])   1. That 
is, the weighted average of the N ﬁ  rms’ conditions equals the sum of the numerators over the 
sum of the denominators.
26. Again, our assumption that the bank does not issue debt is irrelevant for our results. See 
the discussion of the Modigliani-  Miller (1958) theorem at the end of section 7.1.5.
27. We assume that in equilibrium, both the banking sector and agencies/  the bond market 
get the same quality of applicants on average. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs will be indiﬀerent 
about which route they should take to obtain their capital, so assigning them randomly is an 
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screening. Upon concluding the screening process, banks will lend the 
appropriate amount of capital to each ﬁ  rm. The ﬁ  rm must either repay the 
service fees and the productive capital with interest in period t   1 or declare 
bankruptcy. In case of a default, the bank monitors the project and takes 
all that is left after deducting fees, exactly as if the ﬁ  rm had defaulted on a 
bond. At the same time, the bank also gets the fees, so unlike a bondholder, 
a bank truly gets the full residual value of the project!
Next, it is illuminating to partition the bank’s cash ﬂ  ow as if it were pro-
duced by two divisions. The ﬁ  rst, which we term the service division, does 
the actual production of screening and monitoring services, using capital 
chosen in the previous period (KB
t 1) and labor hired in the current period. 
Monitoring services are paid by ﬁ  rms that have declared bankruptcy. But 
because the entrepreneurs have no resources in the ﬁ  rst period of life, the 
fees for the screening services are paid by the other part of the bank, which 
we call the loan division. (Ultimately, of course, the bank will have to obtain 
these resources from its shareholders, as we will show next.) Once the screen-
ing is done, the loan division lends to entrepreneurs the funds it received 
as equity capital. The cash inﬂ  ow of the loan division comes solely from 
returns on loans—either their contractual interest or the bankruptcy value 
of the ﬁ  rm, net of monitoring costs—exactly as in the case of bondholders. 
See ﬁ  gure 7.1 for a diagram showing the cash ﬂ  ows through a bank in any 
pair of periods.
The key to understanding our decomposition of a bank’s cash ﬂ  ow is to 
realize that each period, the bank’s shareholders must be paid the full returns 
Fig. 7.1  Cash ﬂ  ows for a bank’s shareholders who invest in KA
t1 and generation-  t 
ﬁ  rms’ capital
Notes: The bank’s shareholders invest in both the bank’s productive capital KB
t 1 and 
 generation- t ﬁ  rms’ productive capital 	i:Ki
t 1 0Ki




t 1) at the end of period t. The variable KB
t 1 is used in the bank’s production in 
period t   1, while 	i:Ki
t 1 0Ki
t 1 is used in ﬁ  rms’ production. From the bank’s operation (i.e., 
screening generation-  t   1 and monitoring generation-  t projects), the shareholders receive a 
variable proﬁ  t of 	j:Kj
t 1 0fSB
t 1υS(Kj
t 2)   	i:ZMi




t 1) –   Wt 1NB
t 1. The variable IB
t 1 is 
investment, and KB
t 2 –   IB
t 1   (1 –    )KB
t 1; that is, part of the shareholders’ gross return is the 
initial bank capital, net of depreciation. At the end of period t   1, the shareholders either 
receive the contracted interest rate Ri
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on their investment in the previous period. The intuition is the no- arbitrage 
condition as follows: suppose an investor chooses to hold the bank’s stock 
for only one period; then he must be fully compensated for his entire initial 
investment when he sells the stock at the end of the period.28 Because inves-
tors always have the option of selling out after one period, this condition 
must hold, even when investors keep the stock for multiple periods; other-
wise, arbitrage would be possible.
This principle of shareholders receiving the full return on their investment 
every period is most important for understanding the cash ﬂ  ow associated 
with screening. At time t, a group of investors invest in a bank’s equity, con-
ditional on the expected return at time t   1. It is these time-  t shareholders 
who implicitly pay the fees for the bank’s screening of new projects at time 
t, because screening enables them to invest in worthy projects and thus earn 
the returns at time t   1.
We now demonstrate the equivalence between a bank and a rating agency 
plus a bond portfolio. We use a superscript B to denote bank decision vari-
ables. We denote by RH the rate of return that the households require in 
order to hold a bank’s equity. Then, RH will be determined by the following 
asset- pricing  equation:
(21)  Et[mt 1({[fSB
t 1YSB
t 1   fMB
t 1YMB
t 1   W t 1NB
t 1   (1    )KB





t 1   ft
SBυS(Ki
t 1)](1   ZMi
t 1)   [R ˜Ki
t 1Ki





t 1   	i:K
i
t 1 0[Ki
t 1   ft
SBυS(Ki
t 1)]})]   1.
The numerator equals the bank’s total cash ﬂ  ow in period t   1. It is organ-
ized into two parts (in bold brackets and parentheses) to correspond to 
the cash ﬂ  ows of the two hypothetical divisions in order to facilitate the 
comparison of a bank with a rating agency plus a bond portfolio. The ﬁ  rst 
part is the cash ﬂ  ow of the service division, which does all the screening and 
monitoring; every term there is deﬁ  ned similarly to its counterpart in the 
numerator of equation (18)—the cash ﬂ  ow for the rating agency. The sec-
ond part is the cash ﬂ  ow of the loan division, equal to the interest income, 
summed over all the entrepreneurs to whom the bank has made loans, net 
of the monitoring costs. Every term is deﬁ  ned similarly to its counterpart in 
equation (20), which is the return on a diversiﬁ  ed portfolio of many bonds, 
each of which has a payoﬀ similar to the numerator of equation (19).
The denominator of equation (21) is the sum of bank capital, which 
28. Alternatively, one can think of the bank paying oﬀ the full value of its equity each 
period—returning the capital that was lent the previous period, together with the appropriate 
dividends—and then issuing new equity to ﬁ  nance its operations for the current period. Of 
course in practice, most of the bank’s shareholders at time t   1 are the same as the sharehold-
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comprises the amount the bank uses for screening and monitoring (KB), 
the amount it lends to entrepreneurs, and the screening fees put up by this 
period’s shareholders—which is best conceptualized as a form of intangible 
capital.29
Note that in order to derive the respective cash ﬂ  ows of the two divisions 
in the numerator, we deliberately add monitoring income fMBYMB to the 
ﬁ  rst term and subtract monitoring costs ∫ fMBυMZMi from the second. But 
this manipulation on net leaves the bank’s overall cash ﬂ  ow unchanged, 
because
(22)  YMB




The reason is that the monitoring services produced generate income for the 
service division, and those are exactly the services the loan division must buy 
in order to collect from defaulting borrowers.
We have so far accounted for all of the cash inﬂ  ow and outﬂ  ow of the loan 
division and for the cash inﬂ  ow corresponding to the provision of monitor-
ing services for the service division. The next component is the cash inﬂ  ow 
from providing screening services by the service division. According to the 
logic of fully compensating shareholders every period (discussed earlier), 
these screening services are implicitly paid for by time-  t   1 shareholders, 
and the fees constitute part of time-  t shareholders’ return. They are the 
analogue of the screening fees in the denominator, which amount to ft
SBYt
SB 
(for a reason similar to equation [22]), and were paid by time-  t sharehold-
ers to compensate time-  (t –   1) shareholders. The ﬁ  nal component of the 
capital return for the service division is the return of the depreciated capital 
to shareholders. (Depreciated capital is in the capital return of the loan 
division implicitly, because we use gross rates of return in that part of the 
numerator.)
7.2.3      Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information
We do not solve for the full set of equilibrium outcomes for all the vari-
ables, because we need only a subset of the equilibrium conditions to make 
the important points regarding bank output measurement. A major use of 
general equilibrium in our model is that it allows us to derive asset prices 
(and risk premia) endogenously in terms of the real variables (in particular, 
the marginal utility of consumption). Thus, in the context of this model, it 
is clear where everything comes from in the environment facing banks.
The ﬁ  rst step toward proving the nature of the equilibrium is to note that 
the cash ﬂ  ow of any bank can be thought of as coming from two assets that 
households can choose to hold separately, each corresponding to equity 
29. That is, even though not recorded on balance sheets, the screening fees are nonetheless 
part of the overall investment funded by the investors today, and they expect to beneﬁ  t from 
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claims on just one division of the bank. For the purpose of valuing an 
asset, it is immaterial whether the asset actually exists. Thus, it is immaterial 
whether the bank actually sells separate claims on the diﬀerent streams of 
cash ﬂ  ows coming from its diﬀerent operations; no bank does. But inves-
tors will still value the overall bank as the sum of two separate cash ﬂ  ows, 
each discounted by its own risk-  based required rate of return. To take an 
analogy, Ford Motor Company shareholders in the United States certainly 
make diﬀerent forecasts for the earnings of its Jaguar, Volvo, and domestic 
divisions, and they know that exchange rate risk applies to earnings from 
the ﬁ  rst two but not to the third. Shareholders then add these individual 
discounted components to arrive at their valuation of the entire company.
It is important to note that no asset- pricing theory implies a unique way to 
split up a bank’s—or indeed any ﬁ  rm’s—cash ﬂ  ow generated by its various 
operations. Investors can choose to think of a bank as comprising the sum 
of any combination of its operations that adds up to the entire bank’s cash 
ﬂ  ow. The crucial point is that the asset-  pricing equation (4) must apply to 
any and all subsets of a bank’s overall cash ﬂ  ow. But the service versus loan 
division is the most meaningful way of partitioning a bank’s operations for 
the purpose of understanding real bank output, because it separates the 
bank’s production of real output from its holding of assets on behalf of 
its investors. Moreover, this division generates two entities that both have 
real- world counterparts (i.e., rating agencies and bond markets). Therefore, 
this division is most useful, both for understanding and for measuring bank 
output (see our discussion of measurement next). This argument is made 
formally in the working paper version of this chapter (Wang, Basu, and 
Fernald 2004).
In conclusion, in any equilibrium, the service division of the bank must 
have a required rate of return on capital of RSV, and each loan that the bank 
makes must have the same required return, RLi, as it would have were it made 
in the bond market.30
7.2.4      The Model Applied to Measurement
We have presented the essential features of a simple DSGE model with 
ﬁ  nancial intermediation. The model shows that because banks perform 
several functions under one roof, investors view a bank as a collection of 
assets—a combination of a bond mutual fund (of various loans) and a stock 
mutual fund (one that holds the equities of rating agencies). Investors value 
the bank by discounting the cash ﬂ  ow from each asset using the relevant 
risk- adjusted required rate of return for that asset. But in general, all of the 
30. We have shown that in any equilibrium that exists, households demand the same rate of 
return on each division of the bank as the rate on the rating agency and the bond portfolio, 
respectively. We have not claimed that an equilibrium must exist in this model or that the equi-
librium previously described is unique—there may be multiple equilibria, with diﬀerent asset 
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cash ﬂ  ows will have some systematic risk, and thus none of the required rates 
will be the risk-  free interest rate.
In the context of the model, it is clear that proper measurement of nomi-
nal and real bank output requires that we identify the actual services banks 
provide (and are implicitly compensated for) and recognize that these ser-
vices are qualitatively equivalent to the (explicitly priced) services provided 
by rating agencies. So, it is logical to treat bank output the same as the 
explicit output of those alternative institutions.
Another beneﬁ  t of our approach—and a diﬀerent intuition for its valid-
ity—is that the measure of bank output it implies is invariant to alternative 
modes of operation in banks. The prime example is the securitization of 
loans, which has become increasingly popular in recent years, where banks 
originate loans (mostly residential mortgages) and then sell pools of such 
loans to outside investors, who hold them as they would bonds. In this case, 
a bank turns itself into a rating agency, receiving explicit fees for screen-
ing (and servicing over the lifetime of the loan pool). Securitization should 
not change a reasonable measure of bank output, because banks perform 
similar services, regardless of whether a loan is securitized. Our model, 
which counts service provision as the only real bank output, indeed will 
generate the same measure of bank output, regardless of whether loans are 
securitized. But if one follows SNA93, then a bank that securitizes loans 
will appear to have lower output on average, because it will not be credited 
with the output, which is actually the transfer of the risk premium to debt 
holders. Thus, under SNA93, an economy with increasing securitization will 
appear to have declining bank output, even if all allocations and economic 
decisions are unchanged.
7.2.5    Diﬀerent Capital Structures for Banks
The previous subsections of section 7.2 have all assumed that banks are 
100 percent equity ﬁ  nanced. This is unusual, in that we are used to think-
ing of banks as being ﬁ  nanced by debt (largely deposits). But we will show 
next that the MM (1958) theorem holds in our model, so all of our previous 
conclusions are completely unaﬀected by introducing debt (deposit) ﬁ  nanc-
ing. Of course, there is a large literature in corporate ﬁ  nance discussing 
how diﬀerential tax treatment of debt and equity and information asym-
metry (between banks and households, that is) cause the MM theorem to 
break down. But we have deliberately avoided such complications in order 
to exposit the basic intuition of our approach. Once that intuition is clear, 
it will be simple to extend the model to encompass such real-  world com-
plications.
We have an environment where information is symmetric between banks 
and households, so there is no need for screening and monitoring when 
 raise funds from (i.e., sell equity shares to) households. Thus, we reasonably 
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households. We also assume that interest payments and dividends receive 
the same tax treatment. In this setting, banks’ capital structure is irrelevant, 
in that the required rate of return on banks’ total assets is the same, with or 
without debt. When banks are leveraged, the required rates of return on the 
bank’s debt and equity are determined by the risk of the part of the cash 
ﬂ  ow promised to the debt and the equity holders, respectively. Because debt 
holders have senior claim on the bank’s cash ﬂ  ow, the ex ante rate of return 
they require is almost always lower than the rate required by shareholders. 
But the rate of return on the bank’s total assets is the weighted average of 
the return on debt and equity, and it equals the return on the assets of an 
unlevered (i.e., all-  equity) bank. This result is a simple application of the 
MM (1958) theorem.
The implication of this result is that all the preceding analysis of the 
imputation of implicit bank service output remains valid, even when banks 
are funded partly by deposits. We discuss the extension to deposit insurance 
in section 7.3.2; Wang (2003a) analyzes it fully.
The preceding overview of the model and the intuition for the key results 
should equip the reader for analytical details of the model in the appendix.31 
Alternatively, a reader more interested in the measurement implications now 
has the theoretical background for the measurement discussion that follows 
in section 7.3.
7.3      Implications for Measuring Bank Output and Prices
This model yields one overarching principle for measurement: focus on 
the ﬂ  ow of actual services provided by banks. This principle applies equally 
to measuring both nominal and real banking output, and thus the implied 
(implicit) price deﬂ  ator. Following theories of ﬁ  nancial intermediation, we 
model banks as providing screening and monitoring services that mitigate 
asymmetric information problems between borrowers and investors. Because 
screening and monitoring represent essential aspects of ﬁ  nancial services in 
general, we would want any measure of bank output to be consistent with 
the model’s implications. But the SNA93 recommendations for measuring 
implicit ﬁ  nancial services—and the NIPAs implementation—are not. They 
generally do not accurately capture actual service ﬂ  ows.
The model highlights three conceptual shortcomings of the SNA93/ 
NIPAs framework. First, the model shows that the appropriate reference 
rate for measuring nominal bank lending services must incorporate the bor-
rower’s risk premium, which is not part of bank output. Intuitively, the 
31. The appendix focuses on solving analytically the joint determination of the optimal 
contractual interest rate and each entrepreneur’s choice of capital and labor in production. 
In particular, it spells out (a) the exact terms of the debt contract for entrepreneur’s projects 
(including the interest rate charged) that is consistent with bank proﬁ  t maximization and (b) 
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borrowing ﬁ  rm must pay that premium, determined by the intrinsic risk 
proﬁ  le of its cash ﬂ  ow, regardless of whether it obtains the funds through a 
bank or through the bond market (after getting certiﬁ  ed by a credit rating 
agency). The return on the risky assets—loans or bonds—is part of the cost 
of capital to the borrowing ﬁ  rm and is income to households.
Second, the model shows that the timing of bank cash ﬂ  ows often does not 
match the timing of actual bank service output. As a prime example, screen-
ing is typically done before the loan generates income. This problem does 
not necessarily disappear, even when the origination fees are explicitly paid 
up front (ruled out in the model), because generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) often require banks to artiﬁ  cially smooth these revenues 
over the lifetime of the loan, thus inadvertently reinstating the problem.
Third, the measured value of implicit output of services such as monitor-
ing, whose expected value is incorporated in advance into the interest rate 
charged, most likely deviates from the actual output. This is because the 
realization of such services is contingent on loans’ ex post realized return, 
which almost surely deviates from the ex ante expected return. Our model 
suggests that when the observed bank interest income is the realized return, 
the most suitable reference rate is actually the matched holding-  period rate 
of return, not the ex ante expected rate, on a portfolio of debt with compa-
rable risk and no ﬁ  nancial services.
We now discuss further implications of these issues in the context of nomi-
nal and then real output.
7.3.1    Nominal  Bank  Output
Nominal bank services should correspond to the value of service ﬂ  ows 
provided by banks. It should exclude the value of any revenue that might 
ﬂ  ow through a bank that does not, in fact, correspond to actual ﬁ  nancial 
services provided by the bank. This principle is embedded in the key ﬁ  rst-
 order condition for a bank’s optimal choice of contractual loan interest rate, 
RBi
t 1 (i.e., equation [A11] in the appendix):32
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t is the probability that the borrower defaults, (1 –   pi
t) other-
wise. The expected interest payment by the borrower in case of default is 
denoted as Et(Inti
t 1 | Defaulti
t 1). Thus, the terms in square brackets on the 
left- hand side is the expected interest from lending Ki
t 1 to a borrower of risk 
type i; that is, the default probability-  weighted average interest income the 
bank expects to receive. The variable RLi
t 1 is the required rate of return that 
the bond market would charge borrower i for a debt of the same size (and 
32. Note the distinction between the contractual rate and the required rate of return for a 
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by our reasoning in the preceding sections, it is also the return that bank 
shareholders demand for ﬁ  nancing such a bank loan). The variable υt
S(Ki
t 1) 
is the amount of screening services, the price per unit of which is ft
S, and the 
variables υM
t 1(Ki
t 1) and fM
t 1 are the counterparts for monitoring services.
Thus, the left-  hand side is the diﬀerence between the expected bank 
income from loans of risk type i and the (hypothetical) income on a bond 
of the same size with the same risk characteristics. The right- hand side is the 
nominal value of the bank’s expected services of screening and monitoring 
that loan.33
Equation (23) incorporates our three main points regarding measure-
ment. First, consider reference rates. We deﬁ  ne F(RBi
t 1)  [pi RBi
t 1Ki
t 1   
(1 –   pi)Et(Inti
t 1 | Defaulti
t 1)]/  Ki
t 1 as the interest rate the bank expects to 
receive, net of defaults, on loans to borrowers of type i. Then, the left- hand 
side of equation (23), an interest margin, can be expressed as an interest 
spread multiplied by the loan size, Ki
t 1:
(24) [F(RBi
t 1)   RLi
t 1]Ki
t 1.
As Fixler, Reinsdorf, and Smith (2003; hereafter FRS) suggest, one can 
use “interest margins as values of implicit services of banks” (34). The key 
issue is deciding what reference rate(s) to use. Equation (24) makes clear 
that RLi
t 1 is the appropriate reference rate for imputing the implicit value 
of bank output.
Importantly, this reference rate must be risk adjusted (i.e., contain a risk 
premium reﬂ  ecting the systematic risk associated with the loans). In sharp 
contrast, U.S. and other national accounts stipulate a reference rate that 
explicitly excludes borrower risk. The 2003 benchmark revisions of the U.S. 
NIPAs deﬁ  ne the reference rate as the average rate earned by banks on U.S. 
Treasury and U.S. agency securities.34 As FRS argue, “If a highly liquid secu-
rity with no credit risk is available to banks, the banks forego the opportunity 
to earn this security’s rate of return . . . when they invest in loans instead” 
(34). That’s true; but it’s also true that banks forego the opportunity to invest 
in  high- risk/ high- yielding  junk  bonds!
Our model clariﬁ  es the apparent ambiguity inherent in the opportunity 
cost argument by incorporating modern asset- pricing theories (the CCAPM, 
speciﬁ  cally). Indeed, by combining theories of asset pricing and ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation, our model (and Wang’s [2003a]) extends and generalizes 
the user cost framework to take account of uncertainty and asymmetric 
information.
33. The potential monitoring cost is not known in advance but must be expected, because it 
depends on wages and productivity that will be realized in period t   1. The variable Et is the 
expectations operator, conditional on time-  t information.
34. This average rate is not, in fact, a risk- free rate, even in nominal terms. In particular, U.S. 
agency securities have a positive and time-  varying interest spread, reﬂ  ecting credit risk, over 
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Asset- pricing theories imply that an asset’s required rate of return depends 
(positively) on its systematic risk. In two special cases, the required return 
equals the risk- free rate: if there is no systematic risk (i.e., only idiosyncratic 
risk, which creditors can diversify away) or if investors are risk neutral. In 
such a world, there would be no risk premia. Otherwise, the correct refer-
ence rate (i.e., opportunity cost of funds) for imputing bank lending services 
must be adjusted for systematic risk. Thus, our model makes clear that the 
current NIPAs implementation of the user cost approach—with a risk- free 
reference rate for lending services—is not appropriate in the realistic world 
with uncertainty.
What is the intuition for risk- adjusted reference rates? When a bank keeps 
loans on its balance sheet and charges implicitly for services, it sets each 
loan rate to cover both the services provided and the riskiness of the loan. 
In equilibrium, the loan interest rate, net of implicit service charges, must 
compensate the ultimate suppliers of funds (i.e., households in this model) 
for the disutility arising from the risk. Conversely, the borrower could (at 
least conceptually) go to a rating agency, get certiﬁ  ed, and then issue bonds 
at the risk-  adjusted rate. Adjusting reference rates for risk thus preserves 
neutrality with respect to economically identical institutional arrangements 
for obtaining external funds.
Comparison with securitization further illustrates the rationale for risk-
 adjusted reference rates.35 When banks securitize loans, they receive explicit 
payments for services; household optimization implies that the securitized 
asset yields a service-  free interest rate that reﬂ  ects each loan’s risk proper-
ties. However, banks perform the same kinds of screening and monitoring 
services and arrive at much the same optimization rule, which governs the 
service- free interest rates (along with other choice variables), whether loans 
are held on the balance sheet or securitized. The principle of neutrality 
across economically identical lending arrangements implies that bank out-
put measurement should be invariant. Otherwise, measured bank output 
ﬂ  uctuates with the share of securitized loans, even if actual bank services 
are constant over time.
Securitization thus provides a useful conceptual benchmark against which 
to judge the validity of any measure of implicitly priced bank services. Our 
model, in eﬀect, imputes implicit bank output to be invariant, regardless of 
whether loans are securitized. That is, the nominal value of bank services 
equals total bank interest income minus the amount of service-  free pure 
interest—corresponding to the rate that would be charged on a securitized 
loan pool with matching risk (i.e., if the loans were securitized).
Furthermore, the model implies that the NIPAs mismeasure the oppor-
35. By the end of 2003, over 80 percent of residential mortgage loans and 30 percent of 
consumer credit were securitized (Federal Reserve Board 2009) and are an increasing share 
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tunity cost of banks’ own funds (i.e., ﬁ  nancial assets minus liabilities). 
The SNA93 recommends that the opportunity cost of a bank’s own funds 
be netted out of its imputed service output; the version implemented in 
the 2003 NIPAs revision uses the risk-  free rate as the user cost of banks’ 
own funds (see FRS 2003, 36). Our model can be construed as implying a 
similar netting- out principle, because any reference rate can be expressed as 
a weighted average of the respective user cost of banks’ debt and own funds. 
However, the model makes clear that both rates ought to be risk adjusted, 
according to the diﬀerent risk on banks’ debt and own funds, respectively.
More importantly, our model-  implied measure of implicit bank service 
output does not depend on the bank’s capital structure, which is but a coin-
cidental state variable. That is, the opportunity cost of funds for a loan needs 
to be risk adjusted according to the same asset-  pricing theories, regardless 
of whether the lending is ﬁ  nanced by intermediation (i.e., deposit taking) 
or by banks’ own funds.
Counting the risk premium as part of bank output also overstates GDP. 
In the model, GDP is not mismeasured, because ﬁ  nancial services are an 
intermediate input into nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms’ production. An SNA93-  based 
measure misallocates some value added to banks. But the logic of the model 
applies to consumer loans (e.g., mortgages and credit cards), which also 
involve risk and risk- assessment services. So, ﬁ  nal services to consumers and 
GDP would be overstated if we include the risk premium in bank output.
The second general issue that equation (23) highlights is the timing mis-
match between the provision of screening services and the resulting cash 
ﬂ  ow. Banks screen borrowers in period t, but these services are not compen-









t 1). Ideally, one would attribute those services to period 
t, when the bank screens and originates the loans, rather than to t   1.
In principle, if banks charge explicit origination fees upfront—rather than 
rolling these fees into the interest rate—then the timing mismatch becomes 
less important. In practice, ﬁ  rms often do pay explicit origination fees. But 
GAAP require that banks amortize the origination fee over the life of a 
loan. So, the reported income stream is artiﬁ  cially smoothed relative to the 
timing of service provision. If true screening services vary over time, then 
accounting data might not properly reﬂ  ect this variation. In this case, direct 
quantity data (such as counting the number of loans originated) can help 
ensure correct timing.
The third general point from equation (23) is that actual monitoring out-




t 1)] on the right- hand side of 
equation [23]), the value of which is included in the expected interest margin 
(i.e., the left- hand side of equation [23]). That is, the contractual rate covers 
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monitoring takes place only when a borrower actually defaults ex post. In 
fact, neither ex ante nor ex post interest margins match the actual value of 
monitoring, while the two margins almost surely do not equal each other. 
We suspect that in good times, banks do less monitoring than expected, 
while enjoying higher-  than-  expected interest margins; in bad times, they 
do more monitoring than expected, while suﬀering  lower- than- expected 
interest margins. Thus, in a boom, ex post interest margins exceed ex ante 
margins, and in turn exceed the value of banks’ actual service ﬂ  ows. In a 
recession, ex post interest margins fall short of ex ante margins, and in turn 
fall short of the actual value of service ﬂ  ows.36
In general, adjusting the ex post interest margin for the actual rate of 
default yields more accurate measurement of nominal bank service output. 
Such adjustments can be implemented; for example, Wang (2003b) uses 
bank holding company data to adjust the ex post interest income for the 
default realizations.37
This problem of mismeasuring monitoring services is unlikely to disap-
pear, even when one averages over a large number of loans, unless there was 
no aggregate risk. This nondiversiﬁ  able deviation of actual from expected 
cash ﬂ  ow is precisely the reason why there is a risk premium. That is, in good 
times, when output and consumption are high (so marginal utilities are low), 
banks generate more residual cash ﬂ  ow for shareholders; in bad times, when 
output and consumption are low, banks generate less residual cash ﬂ  ow.
We conclude this section by discussing how to extend the model to include 
bank depositor services (e.g., direct transaction and payment services, safe 
deposit boxes, etc.). Conceptually, they raise fewer complications than 
lending services, especially regarding the treatment of risk. Without the 
service component, deposits are simply ﬁ  xed-  income securities. A straight-
forward extension of the model implies that nominal depositor services 
equal the margin between interest paid and interest imputed, using refer-
ence rates based on market debt securities with comparable risk. For bal-
ances covered by deposit insurance, the correct reference rate is the risk- free 
rate, as used in the NIPAs. For balances not covered or without deposit 
insurance, however, depositors would demand a higher expected return that 
depends on the default risk of a bank’s asset portfolio and its capital struc-
ture. So, the NIPAs measure is appropriate only for insured balances and 
is unlikely to remain correct for countries without deposit insurance, such 
as New   Zealand.
36. See appendix 2 in Wang, Basu, and Fernald (2004; hereafter WBF) for technical deriva-
tions of these results and for how to adjust for actual default.
37. Going forward, more relevant data is likely to be generated in the coming implementation 
of the Basel II accord for capital requirement, which encourages banks to develop internal risk 
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7.3.2      Is Risk Assumption a Service?38
One interpretation of the NIPAs choice of the reference rate is that they 
construe risk bearing as an additional service provided by banks.39 Our 
model, on the contrary, considers only screening and monitoring services 
to be bank output, produced using capital and labor. Presumably, one could 
write down alternative internally consistent accounting systems that are con-
sistent with any given economic model. So, one could probably write down 
another accounting system, also internally consistent, where bearing risk is 
treated as service output in all transactions.40
Nevertheless, at least two intuitive criteria help in choosing between 
diﬀerent, internally consistent accounting frameworks. First, one wants 
to choose an accounting framework where the quantities measured have 
natural economic interpretation. Second, the framework should treat identi-
cal market transactions identically. The system we propose meets these two 
criteria. The current system, in contrast, does not.
We have already discussed several examples that illustrate these criteria. 
For example, if ﬁ  rms are indiﬀerent between borrowing from banks or from 
the bond market, then we would want to treat them identically with respect 
to their marginal decisions. The current national accounts do not do so.
More generally, the current system does not treat risk bearing consistently 
across alternative market arrangements. Indeed, the current accounting sys-
tem leads to very peculiar outcomes when applied to outside banks nar-
rowly deﬁ  ned. Consider mutual funds. The account holders of mutual funds 
are owners of the assets—shareholders. Because the current system credits 
bank shareholders with the risk premium for assuming risk, mutual fund 
shareholders should be treated in the same way. Thus, the  NIPAs framework 
would seem to imply that the mutual fund management industry should be 
credited with producing services equal to actual asset returns in excess of the 
risk-  free return (multiplied by the market value of the assets).
We do not think it appropriate to credit the mutual fund industry with 
producing trillions of dollars of value added, corresponding to the diﬀerence 
between average stock returns and risk- free interest. Our framework would 
say that we should credit mutual funds only with providing the services 
that people think they are buying from mutual funds—transactions, book-
keeping services, and sometimes ﬁ  nancial advice. We think this corresponds 
much more closely to the economic reality.
38. We thank Paul Schreyer, whose comment on this chapter stimulated us to add this sec-
tion.
39. For example, FRS (2003) say, “The spread between the reference rate of return and the 
lending rate is the implicit price that the bank receives for providing ﬁ  nancial services to bor-
rowers, which include the cost of bearing risk.”
40. We are not aware of any fully worked out models that explore the full implications of 
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Finally, counting risk assumption as a bank service causes conceptual 
diﬃculties when the resulting measure of output is used in productivity stud-
ies. Suppose one bank turns down very risky loans, whereas another seeks 
out high-  risk projects and lends to them at high interest rates. Suppose also 
that both banks use the same amount of capital and labor to provide exactly 
the same processing services, such as screening and monitoring. They have 
the same output and productivity by our deﬁ  nition. It is undesirable to claim 
instead that the bank making more risky loans—which the other bank could 
have made but declined—is the more productive bank, solely because of the 
riskiness of its loan portfolio.
7.3.3    Real  Bank  Output
It is clear that one wants to measure real output as the actual service ﬂ  ow 
provided by banks. The model aims to focus on the issue of risk and bank 
output measurement; hence, it considers only bank lending activities, which 
essentially involve processing information—speciﬁ  cally, ﬁ  nancial and credit 
data. These services are qualitatively similar to other information services, 
such as accounting and consulting.
Banks provide many distinct types of services. The model captures this by 
the diﬀerent production functions for screening and monitoring. Screening 
depends on the number of new loans issued, whereas monitoring depends on 
the number of outstanding loans (in the model, inherited from last period). 
There is also heterogeneity within either activity. The amount of screening 
and monitoring, respectively, that is needed for a loan depends on many 
factors that diﬀer across loans.41 The model captures this in the form of size 
diﬀerences across loans. The multiproduct nature of bank services implies 
that aggregate bank output should be deﬁ  ned as a Törnqvist or Fisher index 
of the quantity (index) of each distinct service type.
Measuring the real value of monitoring services presents the same 
diﬃculty that aﬀects nominal value measurement: measured output based 
on deﬂ  ated nominal value (assuming both the risk premium and the cost of 
screening are properly accounted for) generally diﬀers from both the actual 
and the expected output of monitoring. Thus, in a downturn, productiv-
ity analysts would see a banking sector experience lower imputed output, 
despite absorbing as much (if not more) primary or intermediate inputs. 
Then, measured banking total factor productivity (TFP) would fall sharply 
in a downturn, even if actual TFP did not change.
The way around this diﬃculty is to measure real monitoring services using 
41. For example, a loan’s denomination, the borrower’s industry and geographic location, and 
his or her previous interaction with the bank are all relevant factors. In practice, the amount 
of screening and monitoring needed diﬀer more across commercial and industrial loans than 
across (conforming) residential mortgage and consumer loans. See WBF (2004) for a more 
detailed discussion of the heterogeneity in information services across diﬀerent categories of 
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direct quantity indicators. For instance, one can make use of the number of 
loans overdue or delinquent in each period to gauge the actual amount of 
monitoring performed; one may be able to collect data also on the associ-
ated costs of restructuring and foreclosure to estimate the quality-  adjusted 
output of monitoring diﬀerent loans.
How do these conceptual issues relate to what the national accounts actu-
ally measure (or attempt to measure)? The national accounts base their 
estimates of real output on a real index of banking services calculated by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In terms of lending activities, the BLS 
(1998) tries to count activities such as the number of loans of various types 
(commercial, residential, credit card, etc.). Within each category, diﬀerent 
loans are weighted by interest rates, the presumption being that loans that 
bear a higher interest rate involve more real services. Across categories of 
services, output is then aggregated using employment weights.
As the BLS technical note makes clear, limitations on the availability 
of appropriate data force many of their choices. Conceptually, at least, we 
highlight a few of the issues suggested by the model.
First, one should try to distinguish new loans from the stock of old loans, 
because they involve diﬀerent services (that is, screening and monitoring, 
respectively). In particular, the timing of when each type of service is under-
taken diﬀers. Second, interest rates are probably not the right weights to use 
within loan category. Relative interest rates contain the compensation for 
(a) systematic risk, (b) screening services, and (c) expected monitoring ser-
vices (tied to expected default probability). Thus, the relative interest rate 
weights are probably correlated with the proper weights–  but imperfectly 
and certainly not linearly. Third, nominal output, instead of employment 
requirement, should be used as the weight for aggregating output across 
categories of services. Last, as noted earlier, one should try to measure real 
monitoring output more directly. Even using the number of outstanding 
loans—as the BLS does, on the grounds that existing and new loans require 
some services—will not capture the likely countercyclical pattern of actual 
monitoring services. (In fact, the number of outstanding loans is more likely 
to be procyclical.)
7.3.4    Price  Deﬂ  ators for Bank Output
Conceptually, what do we mean by the price of ﬁ  nancial services? We use 
what seems like a natural deﬁ  nition of the price deﬂ  ator: the nominal value 
of services divided by the real quantity index. So, the deﬂ  ator is directly 
implied by the preceding discussions of both nominal and real output mea-
sures.
Our deﬁ  nition, although natural and intuitive, diﬀers entirely from the 
common meaning of prices for ﬁ  nancial instruments. The latter often refer 
to interest rates themselves, as in “the interest rate is the price of money,” 
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Similarly, the user cost approach refers to the interest rate spread (between 
the loan rate and a reference rate, scaled by a general deﬂ  ator such as the 
Consumer Price Index [CPI]) as the user cost price of a loan.
This sometimes loose reference to ﬁ  nancial prices can be appropriate in 
the context of discussing rates of return on ﬁ  nancial instruments. But the 
model makes clear that neither the interest rate nor the interest rate spread is 
the price for ﬁ  nancial services, even though banks often charge for these ser-
vices indirectly via an interest rate spread. Similarly, the book value of loans 
is not the right quantity measure of lending services. (Bank eﬃciency studies 
often inappropriately treat loans’ book value—deﬂ  ated with a general price 
deﬂ  ator, such as the CPI—as the quantity of bank output and treat interest 
rate as the price.)
As an explicit example, consider depositor services. Depositors implicitly 
pay for the services they receive by accepting a lower interest rate. Suppose 
a depositor decides to purchase fewer ﬁ  nancial services by putting the same 
deposits in an Internet bank that oﬀers a higher interest rate. The natural 
interpretation is that the nominal quantity of services falls (as measured by 
a lower interest margin) because the real quantity of services falls. It would 
clearly be mistaken to claim that nominal output falls because the price (i.e., 
the interest rate spread) falls, while the quantity (measured by the dollar 
value of deposits) is ﬁ  xed.
In summary, the model implies the proper price of ﬁ  nancial services by 
providing theoretical guidance for measuring the nominal and real values 
of such services. As important, we now discuss how to meet the practical 
challenges of implementing the model’s implied nominal and real output 
measures.
7.3.5      Implementing the Model’s Recommendations in Practice
To properly measure the value of nominal bank services, we must ﬁ  rst 
estimate and remove the risk premium on bank loans. The risk premium on 
comparable market securities (i.e., commercial papers, mortgage-  backed 
securities, etc., that are subject to the same systematic risk) serves as a good 
proxy. Such proxies are readily available. Wang (2003b) suggests some securi-
ties one may use and provides a preliminary estimate of bank service output, 
free of the risk premium. (Her estimate suggests that on average, the risk pre-
mium may amount to 20 to 25 percent of imputed bank service output.)
Arguably, a better alternative is a rate that is adjusted for the risk, as 
assessed according to each bank’s internal risk- rating system. Indeed, Basel 
II requires that banks assess their risks even more carefully than they already 
do—oﬀering an opportunity for improving the accuracy of the estimate of 
risk premia. This should then lead to a more accurate estimate of (a Törn-
qvist or Fisher index of) aggregate real bank output, where the nominal 
output share of each distinct type of bank service serves as the aggregation 
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Second, we need the timing of measured output—screening, in particu-
lar—to match when services are rendered rather than when services generate 
revenue. If explicit origination fees are available for a type of loan, national 
accountants can collect cash-  based accounting data on total origination 
income for that type of loan and estimate the true screening output by deﬂ  at-
ing the income with the explicit fee. The fee can also serve as a proxy for the 
price of similar charges that are implicit. Or, one can derive quantity indexes 
from direct counts of distinct activities (e.g., the number of new credit card 
loans made), and the weighted sum of the growth rates of these indexes gives 
the growth of aggregate service output.
Third, to address the issue that actual monitoring services (both nominal 
and real) are likely to diﬀer from both the expected and the measured value, 
one can make use of bank data on actual loan default rates, as noted previ-
ously. In addition, because the correct reference rate equals the rate of return 
on market securities with comparable risk-  return characteristics as bank 
loans, one can use ex post returns on such matched ﬁ  xed-  income market 
securities to more accurately infer bank service ﬂ  ows.
Finally, consider depositor services. It seems easier to deﬁ  ne a product for 
depositor services than for lending services, because depositor services are 
more homogeneous across banks and in terms of product characteristics.42 
Conceptually, each distinct type of transaction should be viewed as one 
depositor service output. Thus, each ATM or teller-  assisted transaction is 
presumably a composite good of several distinct activities. But for practi-
cal reasons, we can deﬁ  ne each visit to an ATM or a teller as one unit of 
a service product. Similarly, without data on the number of each distinct 
type of transaction, we can treat maintaining each account of a given type 
as one product and use the number of deposit accounts of diﬀerent types 
to measure output. This amounts to assuming that each account of a given 
type requires the same amount of bookkeeping, payment processing, and 
so forth, every period.
7.4      Further Implications for Measurement
The model’s framework helps clarify several other issues in the literature. 
These include the use of assets/  liabilities themselves as a measure of bank 
output, the question of whether to include capital gains as part of bank 
output, and how to measure other ﬁ  nancial services/  instruments provided 
by banks.
First, the model provides no theoretical support for the widespread prac-
tice of using the dollar value of interest-  bearing assets (loans plus market 
42. For instance, safe deposit box rentals are a relatively homogeneous activity, as are wire 
transfers, money orders, and cash withdrawals. To a lesser degree, so are cashing checks and 
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securities) on bank balance sheets deﬂ  ated by, for example, the GDP deﬂ  a-
tor, as real bank output.43 This practice is standard in the empirical micro-
economic literature on bank cost and proﬁ  t eﬃciency.44 Our model suggests 
a simple counterexample, in the spirit of the bank that does nothing. Sup-
pose a bank has accumulated a loan portfolio by doing prior screening and 
monitoring but originates no new loans and does not need to monitor any 
old ones at a particular point in time. Then, our model makes it clear that the 
bank has zero service output in that period. But the microliterature would 
conclude that the bank’s output is arbitrarily large, depending on the size 
of its existing loan portfolio.
Second, although the model does not explicitly consider capital gains, 
it provides a guiding principle for answering the question of whether capi-
tal gains should be counted in banking or ﬁ  nancial output. Capital gains 
and interest income are two often interchangeable ways of receiving asset 
returns, with the former related more often to unexpected returns and the 
latter related more to expected returns. If interest income is often employed 
as implicit compensation for ﬁ  nancial services provided without explicit 
charge, then in principle, capital gains can be used in place of interest for the 
same purpose. By design, such capital gains will be expected gains, because 
the service provider expects to be compensated. These gains should be recog-
nized as implicit compensation for real ﬁ  nancial services. Otherwise, capital 
gains should not be recognized.
To illustrate this principle, we use the same example of screening services 
in lending. Suppose that instead of holding loans on its balance sheet, a bank 
sells them after its shareholders have put up the initial funding, consisting 
of both the productive capital lent to the ﬁ  rms and the screening fees. Also 
assume that the bank only records the value of the capital lent, but not 
the screening fees, as assets on its balance sheet.45 Accordingly, the loans’ 
contractual interest rates are quoted with respect to just the capital lent, 
although the expected value of the interest will cover the screening fees as 
well. Then, when the bank sells these loans (i.e., debt claims on the ﬁ  rms’ 
cash ﬂ  ows), it will enjoy a capital gain equal to the value of the screening fees, 
because the present value of those claims exceeds the book value by exactly 
the amount of the fees. Clearly, the capital gain in this case is qualitatively the 
same as the extra interest income the bank would receive in compensation 
for its services if it kept the loans. So, this capital gain should be counted 
as bank output.
43. Some existing studies also use deposit balance to measure depositor services, implic-
itly assuming that the service ﬂ  ow is in ﬁ  xed proportion to the account balance. But Wang 
(2003a) shows, in realistic settings, that the relationship between the quantity of services and 
the account balance is likely to be highly nonlinear and time varying.
44. See, for example, Berger and Mester (1997) and Berger and Humphrey (1997) for surveys 
of the literature.
45. This is a quite likely scenario, because the fees are like intangible assets, which are often 
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On the other hand, following the same principle, capital gains or losses 
purely due to the random and unexpected realization of asset returns should 
not be counted as ﬁ  nancial output. This can be seen in the model from the 
fact that the ideal reference rate is an ex post rate. The economic intuition is 
fairly clear, although it is best illustrated with multiperiod debts. Suppose we 
modify the model so that entrepreneurs and their projects last three periods. 
Then ﬁ  rms would borrow two-  period debt, which would be screened and 
monitored in the usual way. Suppose also that aggregate technology is seri-
ally correlated. Then, a favorable realization of technology would lead to a 
capital gain on all bonds and bank loans that have yet to mature, because a 
good technology shock today raises the probability of good technology in 
the next period, which reduces the probability of bankruptcy in that period. 
But these capital gains do not reﬂ  ect any provision of bank services—in 
fact, loans one period from maturity would be past the screening phase and 
would not yet require monitoring—and thus, the capital gains should not be 
counted as part of output. Intuitively, the only exception to this rule would 
arise if the capital gains on the loans are due to the provision of some bank-
ing service. For example, if banks provide specialized services to ﬁ  rms that 
make them more productive, which leads to an appreciation in the value of 
their assets, one would want to count some of that gain. This seems unlikely 
in the context of banks but may be realistic for venture capital ﬁ  rms.
Third, our model can be readily applied to value implicit services gener-
ated by banks when they create ﬁ  nancial instruments other than loan con-
tracts, and it can also be applied to measure implicit services generated by 
other ﬁ  nancial institutions that create a wide variety of complex ﬁ  nancial 
instruments.
The general applicability of our method stems from the fact that a loan 
(i.e., bond) subject to default risk is equivalent to a default-  free loan com-
bined with a short position in a put option46 (i.e., giving the borrower the 
option of selling the project to the lender at a prespeciﬁ  ed price). We denote 
the contractual interest rate as Ri and a project’s actual rate of payoﬀ as RA. 
Then, the payoﬀ on a defaultable loan equals min (Ri, RA); a lender receives 
either the promised interest or the project’s actual payoﬀ, whichever is less. 
We can rewrite the risky loan’s payoﬀ as:
(25) min(Ri, RA)   Ri   max(0, Ri   RA).
The ﬁ  rst term describes the payoﬀ from a riskless loan guaranteed to pay 
Ri; the second term, max(.), is the payoﬀ to a put option on the project with 
a strike price of Ri. When the project pays less than Ri, the option holder 
would exercise the option (selling the project and receiving Ri) and earn a net 
46. Put options, in general, oﬀer the holder the option to sell an asset (real or ﬁ  nancial) at a 
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return of Ri –   RA.47 When the project pays more than Ri, the option holder 
would not exercise the option and thus earn zero return. The negative sign in 
front of the second term means the lender of the defaultable loan is shorting 
(i.e., selling to the borrower) the put option. More generally, equation (25) 
describes the fact, well known in corporate ﬁ  nance, that a ﬁ  rm’s bondholders 
essentially write a put option to the ﬁ  rm’s shareholders.
In banks’ cases, this means that issuing a loan is qualitatively the same as 
writing (i.e., holding a short position in) a put option to the borrower. The 
processing costs incurred should be the same as well, because all the risk in a 
defaultable loan lies in the embedded put option. So, screening and monitor-
ing is only needed for that risky component, whereas the other component—
the riskless loan—should involve little information processing. Therefore, 
the implicit services that banks produce in the process of underwriting a loan 
can be viewed as equivalent to services generated in the process of creating 
a ﬁ  nancial derivatives contract.
This means the measure of implicit bank services implied by our model 
can be applied equally well to similar services that ﬁ  nancial institutions 
generate in creating other types of ﬁ  nancial instruments. The general prin-
ciple is the same: apply asset-  pricing theories to price the ﬁ  nancial instru-
ment by itself; the diﬀerence between that value and the contract’s actual 
value yields the nominal value of the implicit services. Measurement issues 
similar to those related to lending, as previously discussed at length, will no 
doubt arise; our recommendations for implementing the output measure in 
practice apply then as well.
7.5    Conclusions
We develop a dynamic stochastic GE model to address thorny issues in 
measuring ﬁ  nancial service output. Financial institutions perform screening 
and monitoring services to resolve asymmetric information. Measuring real 
output involves measuring the ﬂ  ow of actual ﬁ  nancial services produced; 
measuring nominal output requires measuring the income that correspond 
to these services. Equilibrium asset- pricing conditions help resolve some of 
the perplexing conceptual issues in the literature.
A key result, as in Wang (2003a), is that the risk premium on loans is 
not part of banks’ nominal output, because it does not correspond to the 
screening and monitoring services provided by banks. The risk premium is 
part of the capital income transfer from the ﬁ  nal users to the ultimate sup-
pliers of loanable funds (i.e., from the borrowing ﬁ  rms to households). The 
47. This is, in eﬀect, one way to describe default: a defaulted borrower’s zero total payoﬀ can 
be decomposed into two pieces—a negative net worth of RA –   Ri exactly oﬀset by a positive 
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rationale is intuitive enough: one wants to measure the output of economi-
cally similar institutions the same way. In the model and in the world, bank 
services to borrowers essentially combine the services of a rating agency 
with funding through the bond market. But the bond market is clearly just 
a conduit for transferring funds from households to ﬁ  rms; equally clear, the 
return on those funds, including any risk premium, is not the output of the 
rating agency!
Conversely, our implied output measure also satisﬁ  es the intuitive prin-
ciple that a ﬁ  rm’s output is invariant to the speciﬁ  c institutional source of 
external funding, as long as its liabilities have the same risk-  return pro-
ﬁ  le and incur the same informational services. The ﬁ  rm pays the same risk 
premium and the same service charges (implicit or explicit), regardless of 
whether the funds ﬂ  ow through a bank or through the bond market.
The model highlights the conceptual shortcomings in the existing na-
tional accounting measure of bank output. By counting the risk premium 
as part of nominal bank output, the current SNA93 and NIPAs measures 
treat economically identical alternative funding institutions diﬀerently and 
alter the output of the borrowing ﬁ  rm, depending on its source of funding. 
At the same time, the model makes clear that the book value of ﬁ  nancial 
instruments on the balance sheet of banks, commonly used as the measure 
of bank output in the large body of bank eﬃciency studies, generally does 
not correspond to the true bank output, nominal or real.
In addition, we highlight two practical problems. First, the timing of 
cash ﬂ  ows often does not match the timing of actual bank services, because 
the bank screens in advance and then generates income over time. Second, 
expected bank net interest income incorporates the ex ante expected value of 
providing monitoring services; but ex post the quantity and nominal value 
of these services do not match the realized net interest income of the bank. 
We have discussed ways to resolve these problems.
More generally, we advocate a model-  based approach to measurement 
for conceptually challenging areas of ﬁ  nancial services and insurance.48 We 
suggest that researchers write down an explicit optimizing model of what 
each ﬁ  rm/ industry does. A model clariﬁ  es what we want to measure and thus 
what the ideal data set is. Only after we know how to do measurement in 
principle can we begin to compromise in practice. And if the shadow costs of 
the data availability constraints are too high, the measurement community 
can call for additional data collection projects.
Our approach suggests several priorities for extending theory and col-
lecting data. Our method applies directly to bank services produced in the 
process of generating ﬁ  nancial instruments other than loans (e.g., lines 
48. For recent studies, see, for example, Schreyer and Stauﬀer (2003), who consider an exten-
sive set of services provided by ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms; chapter 6 in Triplett and Bosworth (2004b) 
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of credit, derivatives). Likewise, our model applies to the production of 
ﬁ  nancial services by nonbank intermediaries. Thus, our work serves as a 
template for measuring ﬁ  nancial service output of the ﬁ  nancial sector more 
generally. Also, our method connects ﬁ  nancial measurement to the vast 
body of research on asset pricing and corporate ﬁ  nance. Thus, conclusions 
from these literatures on some real-  world complexities (e.g., realistic tax 
treatment of interest and capital gains) can be readily incorporated. Wang 
(2003a) discusses some of these issues in depth, such as the eﬀects of deposit 
insurance.
On data collection, Basel II reporting requirements can generate data on 
the risk proﬁ  les of banks’ assets. Also, constructing an index of real bank 
output requires improved surveys; for example, direct quantity counts for a 
wider variety of bank activities would be useful, and data on how marginal 
costs of originating and monitoring loans vary with size and other attributes 
would help with quality adjustment.
We conclude by summarizing the answers to the four questions posed in 
the abstract. First, the correct reference rates on loans must incorporate risk. 
Second, one does not want to use an ex ante measure of the risk premium on 
bank funds in each reference rate—using an ex post holding return on bonds 
of comparable riskiness comes closer to measuring the actual production 
of bank services. But the timing mismatch and other problems mean that 
in general, no single reference rate provides a perfect measurement of the 
nominal value of implicit service output. Third, the price deﬂ  ator for ﬁ  nan-
cial services generally is not the overall price level. Financial services are an 
information product, qualitatively similar to other information processing 
services (e.g., consulting); in general, the price of ﬁ  nancial services relative 
to ﬁ  nal output will not be constant. Fourth, we should count capital gains 
as part of ﬁ  nancial service output only if the gains are expected as implicit 
compensation for actual services provided.
Appendix
Financial Intermediation under Asymmetric 
Information and Bank Output
This appendix solves a bank’s and its borrower’s joint optimization problem 
to derive analytically why and how implicit bank output can be measured by 
decomposing a bank’s overall cash ﬂ  ow.49 The key equation underlying the 
decomposition is the one that sets the optimal interest rate on a bank loan.
49. This is a summary of appendix 1 in WBF (2004), which the reader is urged to consult 
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Screening and Monitoring
In the model, each project (operated by a ﬁ  rm that is owned by an entre-
preneur) spans two periods. Banks’ ﬁ  rst function is to screen each project in 
the ﬁ  rst period to uncover its credit risk, which determines the loan’s interest 
rate. We assume that banks’ screening technology can fully discern a project’s 
type, denoted  i, to avoid unnecessary complications. Because entrepreneurs 
have no initial wealth, banks price the implicit fee into the interest charged, 
to be paid next period. Firms then use the loans to purchase capital.
In the second period, each ﬁ  rm uses the capital to produce the single 
homogeneous ﬁ  nal good of the economy and is liquidated at period end. 
The lending bank takes no further action unless a ﬁ  rm defaults, in which 
case the bank incurs a cost to monitor the ﬁ  rm and extracts all the residual 
payoﬀ.50
In summary, banking service output consists of screening the new proj-
ects born in each period and monitoring the old projects that fail. Screening 
and monitoring have diﬀerent production functions. They parsimoniously 
represent the myriad of tasks performed by banks in their general role as 
information processors in the credit market. So, the analysis here can be 
readily adapted to study (implicit) bank output in creating other ﬁ  nancial 
instruments, such as derivatives contracts.
Bank Cost Functions for Screening and Monitoring
A loan’s interest rate depends in part on the bank’s cost of screening 
and monitoring. So, we ﬁ  rst detail properties of these two cost functions. 
Banks have the same CRS technology as the rating agency for screening 
and monitoring, respectively (see equation [12]).51 The cost of screening 
or monitoring varies with each loan’s attributes, most likely in a nonlinear 
fashion. The model represents loan attributes with a single dimension of 
size. Then, the cost of screening (S) or monitoring (M) a single loan of size 
Li in time t can be written as
(A1)  ct
J   υJ(Li
t)fJ(W t, Rt
SV   1    ) 
















,     J   S, M.
The term ft
J(.) is the cost of processing a numeraire loan (whose size is 
normalized to one). So, it only depends on factors common to all (S and 
50. That is, we adopt the standard costly state veriﬁ  cation setup from Townsend (1979). 
See WBF (2004) for a discussion of its distinction from the monitoring function in Diamond 
(1991).
51. That is, referring to the constant marginal cost of processing each additional loan of given 
attributes. The CRS assumption is made for simplicity, given that the degree of returns to scale 
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M)s output: input prices (the wage rate Wt and the shadow rental price of 
bank capital Rt
SV –   1    ; see section 7.1), output elasticities ( J), and the 
technology parameter (AJ). The other term υJ(Li), which depends solely 
on size, then scales the numeraire cost across loans of diﬀerent sizes. Given 
perfect competition for both screening and monitoring, ft
J will also be the 
price (relative to the price of the ﬁ  nal good) of the respective numeraire ser-
vice, and υJ(Li) will be the weight for aggregating services.
We assume, intuitively, that the cost of monitoring a loan grows more 
slowly than linearly in loan size; that is, υM    0, and υM    0. Aggregate 
monitoring output then depends on not only the sum but also the distri-
bution of loan sizes. On the other hand, υS(.) is assumed to be convex for 
technical reasons (explained next).
Terms of the Loan Contract for Entrepreneurs’ Projects
We now describe terms of the loan contract, which will enter a bank’s opti-
mization problem in the next section. For a penniless entrepreneur i born in 
period t (called generation-  t) to purchase capital Ki
t 1 for his or her project, 
he or she must borrow Ki
t 1 (the subscript denoting the period in which the 
capital is used in production), plus the screening fee ft
SυS(Ki
t 1), and must 
pay oﬀ everything at the end of period two from the project’s payoﬀ.
Project i, arriving in period t, pays  iRK
t 1 for every unit of investment, 
where RK
t 1 is the average ex post gross return (to be realized in period t   1) 
across all potential projects, while  i is the project- speciﬁ  c risk parameter of 
i (i.e., type) uncovered by the bank screening process. The variable  i depends 
on the random draw of i from the distribution of project productivities, zi.52 
So,  i is independently and identically distributed across time and projects. 
We denote its cumulative distribution function as G( ), with E( )   1. The 
variable RK
t 1 represents the aggregate risk and thus depends on the reali-
zation of the aggregate productivity shock in period t   1 (i.e., At 1).53 We 
denote the conditional cumulative distribution function as simply F(RK
t 1), 
which is assumed to be diﬀerentiable over a nonnegative support. The vari-
able  i is uncorrelated with RK
t 1, because zi and At 1 are uncorrelated.
Because project payoﬀ is borrowers’ sole source of income for repayment, 
it is intuitive to map the contractual rate for loan i (call it Ri
t 1) into a (unique) 
threshold value of the aggregate return RK
t 1(call it RKi





t 1)]    iRKi
t 1Ki
t 1. So, F(RKi
t 1) is the endogenous default probability 
of i. The lender’s expected gross return is F(RKi
t 1) iKi
t 1, where  (RKi
t 1)  
[1 –  F(RKi
t 1)]RKi




t 1)—the two terms being the expected rate 
of return, conditional on no default and default, respectively.
52. Section 1.G of appendix 1 in WBF (2004) derives the exact mapping between  i and zi 
for given At 1:  i   [ϒ(zi)1/      (1 –    )]/ [ϒκ   (1 –    )], where κ  	 
zminz1/   Ki
t 1dϑ(z)/  KNF
t 1 and ϒ  
(At 1)1/     [(1 –    )/  Wt 1](1/   – 1). It is omitted here due to space constraint.
53. Wang, Basu, and Fernald (2004) explain in detail why omitting project-  speciﬁ  c noises in 
each project’s realized return does not alter the model’s implications for output measurement.316    J.  Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
Financial Intermediaries’ Optimization Problem
This subsection solves banks’ optimal production plan and loan interest 
rate. The representative bank maximizes the present value of cash ﬂ  ows by 
choosing RKi



















t 1   fM
t 1υM(Ki
t 1)]dG( ) 
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t 1)dG( )   W t 1NB
t 1   IB
t 1,
subject to the constraints:
(A3)  RKi














t 1)dG( )   AM
t 1(KM
t 1) M(NM
t 1)1  M,
(A6)  Nt
B   Nt
S   Nt
M, and N0
M   0,
(A7)  KB
t 1   Kt
B(1    )   It
B, where Kt
B   Kt
S   Kt
M; Given K0
B   K0
S,
(A8)  KNF
t 1   Kt
NF(1    )   It
NF, where Kt




tdG( ); Given K0
NF,
(A9)  KS
t 1   KM




t 1   f t
SυS(Ki
t 1)]dG( )   Vt
B.
Expectations in equation (A2) are taken over the distribution of RK
t 1. The 
ﬁ  rst two integrals are the overall interest (net of monitoring fees fM
t 1υM[Ki
t 1]) 
the bank will receive in period t   1. The third integral is the productive 
capital the bank passes on to generation- t   1 entrepreneurs after screening 
them. So, the sum of the three terms constitutes the cash ﬂ  ow of the loan 
division. The remaining terms form the cash ﬂ  ow of the bank’s services di-
vision, whose implicit outputs of screening (YS




t 2)dG( ) and 	0
  ˆυM(Ki
t 1)dG( ), respectively. The variables fS
t 1 and 
fM
t 1 are the respective shadow prices, and Wt 1 is the wage rate in period 
t   1; NB
t 1 is the bank’s total labor input, and IB
t 1 is its total investment. Bank 
shareholders both pay (as debtholders of nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms) and receive 
(as owners of the bank) the monitoring fees, so the two ﬂ  ows exactly oﬀset 
each other in the bank’s overall cash ﬂ  ow.
In equation (A3),   ˆ identiﬁ  es the type of borrowers who are just able to 
pay their loan interest, given the realized RK
t 1. Equations (A4) and (A5) are 
the production functions for screening in period t and monitoring in period A General Equilibrium Approach to the Measurement of Bank Output    3 1 7
t   1, respectively. Total labor input is given in equation (A6), and N0
M   
0 (and K0
M   0), given no monitoring at t   0. Equations (A7) and (A8) 
describe the motion of the bank’s and nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms’ capital, respec-
tively.
Equation (A9) is the bank’s balance sheet: the value of equity (Vt
B) equals 
the value of assets, consisted of productive capital to be used in screening 
(KS
t 1) and monitoring (KM
t 1) next period, funds [	0
 Ki
t 1dG( )] transferred to 
borrowing ﬁ  rms, and this period’s screening fees, which can be thought of 
as an intangible asset that will generate income in the next period, because 
it will be repaid by borrowing ﬁ  rms, on average.
The variable RH in equation (A2) needs elaboration. It is bank share-
holders’ required rate of return, equivalent to the return on total assets for 
a fully equity-  funded bank. Thus, RH is determined by the risk proﬁ  le of 
total bank cash ﬂ  ow, according to households’ Euler equation (6). Section 
7.1 has shown that RH is the weighted average of (implicit) required rates 
on the two partial cash ﬂ  ows generated by the loan division and the services 
division—RL and RSV, respectively. Correspondingly, equation (A2) can be 
decomposed into two terms, as follows:54
(A10)  E0


















t 1   f M
t 1υM(Ki
t 1)]dG( ) 




























t 2)dG( ) 





t 1)dG( )   Wt 1NB
t 1   IB
t 1.
This partition maps into a bank’s cash ﬂ  ow under securitization: banks 
receive origination fees up front and servicing fees over the lifetime of the 
loan pool. (See section 7.3 for more discussions.) Investors then receive the 
residual interest payments. This also maps into a rating agency plus a bond 
issue (section 7.1).
The Determination of the Contractual Interest Rate
The loan division’s optimal decision (the ﬁ  rst component in equation 
[A10]) sets the contractual interest rate. It contains all the relevant cash 
ﬂ  ows—including the processing cost—for the debtholders. It expresses the 
condition that the interest rate charged must generate an expected return 
(net of the monitoring cost) equal to the ex ante rate of return required by 
households on their investment. This condition must hold for every loan 
54. This is under the implicit assumption that bank services are paid ﬁ  rst, before shareholders 
receive the residual interest.318    J.  Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
to avoid arbitrage. So, the optimal rate (RKi
t 1) on a loan to a generation-  t 
entrepreneur (i) must satisfy:55
(A11) [1    F(RKi
t 1)] iRi
t 1Ki








    Et[f M
t 1]υM(Ki
t 1)F(RKi
t 1)   RLi
t 1f t
SυS(Ki
t 1)   RLi
t 1Ki
t 1.
This is the key ﬁ  rst- order condition from the bank’s maximization problem 
set up in equations (A2) through (A9). Note that the relevant discount rate 
for the risky debt return is RLi but not RHi. As intuition suggests, equation 
(A11) implies that the higher the screening or monitoring costs, the worse 
the project types, and lower means of RK
t 1 all lead to higher RKi
t 1.56 To ensure 
a ﬁ  nite scale of operation at each ﬁ  rm, we assume that RKi
t 1 falls with loan 
size (Ki
t 1).
Optimal Choice of Capital by Nonﬁ  nancial Firms
Entrepreneur i chooses Ki
t 1 to maximize the expected utility of his resid-
ual return:57
(A12) max  Et(Ui










subject to the constraint in equation (A11). The variable U(.) is the usual 









t 1   RKi
t 1)   

 RKi




t 1)   0.
The implicit relationship between RKi
t 1 and Ki
t 1 is represented by  RKi
t 1/   Ki
t 1, 
embedded in equation (A11). Clearly, RKi
t 1 and Ki
t 1 are jointly determined 
by the bank and the ﬁ  rm’s optimization problems.
Equation (A13) makes it clear that for given F(RK
t 1), the contractual loan 
rate needs to rise in the size of the loan (i.e.,  RKi
t 1/   Ki
t 1   0) to obtain a 
ﬁ  nite optimal Ki
t 1.58 For individual Ki
t 1 to be determinate, an upward-
 sloping supply curve for funds is also necessary (i.e., the optimal solution of 
Ki
t 1 rises in the mean of RK
t 1), given that ﬁ  rms’ technology is CRS. In fact, 
this means that production will not happen just at the most eﬃcient ﬁ  rm 
55. Note that f M
t 1 is not known when RKi
t 1 is chosen in period t, and hence the expectations 
operator.
56. See WBF (2004) for derivations of these and all the other comparative statics, and if rele-
vant, the conditions under which they are obtained. None of the conditions aﬀect the model’s 
conclusion regarding bank output measurement.
57. This formulation is consistent with equation (10) in the text, except that here, the entrepre-
neur’s payoﬀ is expressed all in terms of his or her residual return on capital, which has already 
accounted for the cost of labor and bank information services implicitly. Section G of appendix 
1 in WBF (2004) shows the exact mapping between the two formulations.
58. Wang, Basu, and Fernald (2004) discuss in detail the conditions under which this result 
arises. In general, it seems to call for more than simple processing costs. But the exact mecha-
nism matters not for our purpose—deriving the proper output measure.A General Equilibrium Approach to the Measurement of Bank Output    3 1 9
(i.e., with the highest  i, corresponding to z  in section 7.1). Instead, banks 
lend to a group of ﬁ  rms with a descending order of  i until aggregate capital 
stock is all utilized; the more eﬃcient a ﬁ  rm, the larger its capital size. All 
else equal, the more capital available, the larger the set of ﬁ  rms that invest. 
On the other hand, given the aggregate capital stock, higher screening or 
monitoring cost means a larger set of ﬁ  rms will invest, and the eﬃciency 
level of the marginal ﬁ  rm will be lower.
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Comment  Paul Schreyer
Introduction
The topic of banking output has long been a thorny issue for national 
accountants and analysts of banking performance and productivity. Chris-
tina Wang, Susantu Basu, and John Fernald (see chapter 7 of this volume; 
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